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Abstract 
 
Abstract: When Armenia and Georgia exited the Soviet Union in 1991, massive popular 
majorities in both countries voted for independence in nationwide referenda. Over thirty-years 
later, Armenia and Georgia have chartered two radically distinctive pathways for their states 
within the near abroad. Tbilisi has become a reliable opponent of Russia within the post-Soviet 
space as it pursues integration into NATO and the European Union. Yerevan, by contrast, is 
closely associated with Russia, and has joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. This 
thesis employs a comparative framework to evaluate the sources behind this divergence. The 
research identifies three determining variables behind this divergence. The first is shared elite 
geo-political visions for the state (“constructed realities”), informed by historical and post-Soviet 
developments, that shape the national trajectories either towards close association with Russia or 
defection to the West. The second is the extent of economic dependence between the subject 
country and Russia and the reaction of national elites to that linkage. Finally, the two variables 
are mutually reinforcing and serve to confirm the overall trajectory of relations.  
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Introduction 
  
In March 1991, the semi-autonomous Republic of Armenia and Republic of Georgia 
boycotted Mikhail Gorbachev’s “All-Union'' referendum to reform the Soviet Union and convert 
it into the “Union of Sovereign States.” Over the following six months, national authorities in 
both republics organized popular referenda on the issue of independence. The results were near 
unanimous. With majorities that surpassed ninety-nine percent, the polls demonstrated a clear 
repudiation of a continued association with the Soviet Union and preceded formal independence 
that same December. But for Tbilisi and Yerevan, independence was not just a rejection of the 
Soviet Union; it was a rejection of Russia. Since independence, however, national perspectives 
and policies on Russia in the two republics have diverged dramatically. In Georgia, the anti-
Russian sentiment evident in the 1991 independence movement has intensified, exemplified by 
Georgia’s geopolitical alignment with the West. By contrast, Armenia has deepened its ties with 
Russia, even going so far as to join Russia in the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite cyclical 
electoral and revolutionary changes in the status of elite Caucasian politics, the trajectory of 
bilateral relations with Russia has remained consistent in Armenia and Georgia. The causes of 
this divergence in Russian relations constitute the subject of this investigation: why do post-
Soviet states (Armenia and Georgia) embrace different foreign policy trajectories vis-a-vis 
Russia? This paper argues that the closeness and contentiousness of Russian relations in Georgia 
and Armenia—tracked by engagement with Russian or Western economic and security 
institutions—is principally determined by three variables: economic dependency, shared geo-
political visions for the state (‘constructed realities’) among elite actors, and the interaction 
between the two.  
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This research employs a comparison of Armenian and Georgian post-independence 
engagement in Russian-led or Western-led international institutions and bilateral agreements as 
an indicator of the status of relations with Moscow. The three variables are analyzed as 
motivating causes of a ‘deepening’ or ‘defection’ from Russia as expressed in the direction of 
institutional engagement, resulting in a definitive ‘Russia decision’ for each country. The 
structure of the thesis is therefore organized into three sections. The first section provides an 
outline of the trajectory of Georgian and Armenian relations with Russia and the West from 
independence to the present. The second section features a constructivist foreign policy analysis 
to argue that national trajectories were determined by shared elite visions for the state within the 
post-Soviet space. The third section evaluates the extent of economic dependency, the reaction of 
elites to this dependence, and subsequent engagement or defection from Russian international 
economic institutions and bi-lateral agreements. A brief discussion of how these two variables 
interacted and a review of the key points of comparison then follows before the conclusion. The 
subsequent introduction features a contextual review of Russia and the near abroad, the selection 
of cases and controls, the discussion of the dependent variable, and the research design and 
framework.  
Russia and the Near Abroad 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western alliances and institutions have pressed 
ever closer to the Russian perimeter. Two NATO members in the Baltic, Estonia and Latvia, 
already share a frontier with Russia, and further additions to the borderland coalition remain a 
legitimate plausibility, especially in Georgia and Ukraine. The encroachment is supported by 
narratives which seek to legitimize the expansion of the Western alliance structure by defending 
the strict sovereignty of states to determine their own international affiliations and by expanding 
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constructed narratives of a ‘Western’ community.1 Unsurprisingly, Russia has drawn charges of 
revisionism following interventions—first in Georgia in 2008 and again in Ukraine in 2013—as 
the Kremlin reacts to NATO’s enlargement process.2 Interwoven into Western accusations of 
Russian revisionism is the notion of the blizhneye zarubezhye, approximately translated as the 
“near abroad.” The phrase, as commonly understood, refers to a Russo-centric geopolitical 
concept composed of the fifteen former Soviet republics that attained their independence with 
the Soviet Union’s disintegration.3 
For many Western observers the term conveys Russia’s acute reluctance to acknowledge 
the sovereignty of the former republics and reflects Moscow’s ambition to restore its old sphere 
of influence over the adjacent post-Soviet states. The Western view of Russia’s actions has 
played into critical evaluations of Russia’s behavior as it pertains to violent entanglements in the 
near abroad. After the 2008 Georgian war, for example, Vice President Joseph Biden denounced 
Russian designs for a near abroad sphere of influence, a view that was countered by then 
President Dmitry Medvedev’s position that it was legitimate for Russia and post-Soviet states to 
see each other as reciprocal zones of interest.4 Western scrutiny of Russia’s intent in the near 
abroad intensified following President Vladimir Putin’s often mis-construed statement that the 
breakup of the USSR was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. Despite the 
alarm stirred by analysts that Putin’s statement presaged a grand attempt at re-constituting the 
Soviet Empire, Putin was merely reflecting on the exceptional challenge in the post-Soviet states 
of managing cross-border networks and national relationships established under the contiguous 
 
1 Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of 
Identity,” Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 361.  
2 John Russell “Whose ‘near abroad’? Dilemmas in Russia’s declared sphere of privileged interests,” in Russia and 
its Near Neighbours, eds. Maria Freire and Roger E. Kanet (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 113-4.  
3 Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 3.  
4 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Sphere of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 3-4). 
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Soviet Union. Mainstream Western attitudes toward the practical and theoretical essence of the 
‘near abroad’ are woefully insufficient for understanding the geopolitical and emotional reality. 
In fact, the phrase predates Putin and his associated foreign policy of assertive and reactive 
interventionism. The concept originated in the immediate post-Soviet moment when Russians 
were grappling with the change in the territorial status quo.5 As early as 1994, Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev used the term to clarify Russia’s “special interests” in the near abroad.6 
The extent of shared historical, socioeconomic, and demographic phenomenon 
throughout the post-Soviet space made such an appellation almost inevitable. Near abroad 
networks were so extensive that they even molded the development of identity in the constituent 
republics and shaped the direction of modern realities and conflicts. Disintegration forced 
Russians and their now independent neighbors to address complex issues of cross-boundary 
identity, political association, and economic direction.7 Indeed, many successor states within this 
category of ‘near abroad’ responded to the challenge by framing their post-Soviet narratives as 
compatible, not antagonistic, with Russia. Thus the ‘near abroad’ permeates beyond power 
politics, and forms what Gerard Toal described as a “new arrangement of sovereignty and an old 
familiarity, a longstanding spatial entanglement and a range of geopolitical emotions.”8 Great 
power ambitions were not the only motivations behind the idea of the ‘near abroad.’ Instead, 
common features and challenges demanded a conceptual framework for Russians to understand 
the post-Soviet republics during a period of exceptional upheaval. 
 
5 Toal, Near Abroad, 3. 
6 Bohuslav Litera "The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine," Perspectives, no. 4 
(1994): 45. 
7 Zbigniew Wojnowski, The Near Abroad: Socialist Eastern Europe and Soviet Patriotism in Ukraine, 1956-1985  
(Toronto: Tornoto University Press, 2017), 207-18. 
8 Toal, Near Abroad, 3. 
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Nevertheless, successor states within the near abroad framework show little uniformity in 
their approach to Russian relations. Certain post-Soviet republics, such as the Baltic states, have 
invited Western political and economic institutions into their countries, fostering enduring 
suspicion from the Kremlin. By contrast, Armenia and Belarus, for example, retain intimate ties 
with Moscow and engage in Russia’s multinational institutions. In other states, as in Ukraine, 
dramatic vacillations between European integration and Russian linkage confuse any clear 
dichotomy. This has been amplified by regional cleavages within Ukraine that sharply divide 
along the lines of attachment to Russia (eastern Ukraine) or Western Europe (western Ukraine). 
The foreign policy decision for post-Soviet states to either cooperate, and retain close ties with 
the Russian Federation, or defect, and pursue affiliation with the United States and the European 
Union, can impact the political and economic configurations of the near abroad states. In 
Ukraine, the principal catalyst for the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution was national disagreement 
over trade negotiations with the European Union, which endangered extant commercial 
agreements with Russia. For Russia the spillover from Ukraine and the invasion of Crimea 
prompted international sanctions that wounded the Russian economy.9 Clearly, the status of 
Russian relations has dramatic consequences for both the economic and political future of states 
in the near abroad. 
  
Research Question: Co-operate or Defect? 
Relations between Russia and the post-Soviet states evidently matter for both the post-
Soviet states and for the Russian Federation as well as for broader political stability across 
Eurasia. But less discernible are the underlying causes for the alignment; why do states within 
 
9 Evesy Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy, “The impact of financial sanctions on the Russian economy,” Russian Journal 
of Economics 1, no. 4 (2015). 
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the framework of the ‘near abroad’ embrace different foreign policy trajectories vis-a-vis Russia? 
In this case, the question applies to Armenia and Georgia, and considers why the former “co-
operated” with Russia and the latter “defected” from it. 
For some experts in the post-Soviet literature, the attitudes of the post-Soviet states 
towards Russia reflect different responses to Moscow’s alleged belligerence. Proponents of this 
interpretation assume that the state of relations between post-Soviet states and Russia reflects 
Moscow’s revanchist foreign policy in the near abroad.10 Mitchell Orenstein, for example, 
asserts that Russia’s "kleptocratic, mafia state" is "determined to reconstruct" the Soviet empire 
in the post-Soviet space.11 Timothy Snyder agrees that Putin “chose empire over integration” 
invading neighbors in the near abroad to extend Russia’s influence and territorial reach.12 
Conclusions such as these form a conventional wisdom that recur throughout the academic 
literature. For example, academics have argued in many cases that friendly relations with Russia, 
signaled by engaging in Russian international organizations and bi-lateral agreements, are an 
indication of coercion on behalf of Russia.13 These relations are generally examined with an 
exaggerated focus on Russian initiative and aggression. Fortunately, a growing counter-literature 
has sought to reframe the narrative under the theory that Russia either operates in the 
international system as a defensive state, or as an isolationist-aggressive power.14 This research 
intends to contribute to this counter-literature by examining the sources of post-Soviet relations 
beyond a focused emphasis of Russian foreign policy. 
 
10 Elias Götz and Camille-Renaud Merlen, “Russia and the question of world order,” European Politics and Society 
20, no. 2 (2019): 135-7. 
11 Mitchell Orenstein, The Lands In Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2019), 11-51.  
12 Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 80-1. 
13 Laetitia Spetschinsky and Irina V. Volgova, “Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial? The relations 
between Russia and Georgia after 1991,” European Review of International Studies 1, no. 3 (2014) 
14 Götz and Merlen, “Russia and the question of world order,” 137-42.  
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To answer this question, the analysis depends primarily upon a comparative research 
approach with a selection of two post-Soviet states and a focus on the Transcaucasian region. 
Each state has been examined with the intention of analyzing the factors behind each actor’s 
decision to cooperate with or defect from Russia. For the sake of convenience, the research 
describes this process as the “Russia decision,” though this typology does not imply the decision 
was taken at a specific moment. In fact, many of the factors indicate a more gradual formulation 
of diplomatic posture beyond the policies of any one administration. Nonetheless, the impact of 
specific leaders and elites remains a prioritized feature. This is unavoidable given the established 
personalism of Transcaucasian political governments and political parties.15 
 
The Cases: Armenia and Georgia 
  
The historical and political inputs that influence the “Russia decision” necessarily vary by 
polity. As a consequence, the research approach requires a robust control system to ensure wide 
discrepancies on a state-by-state basis do not undermine the conclusion. Though differences in 
historical experience, political organization, and geography potentially could render cross-
regional comparisons less relevant and less applicable, the examination anticipates challenging 
the aforementioned conventional wisdom and illustrating the determinability of a wider array of 
forces beyond alleged Russian aggression. 
As a result of these cross-regional limitations, intra-regional analysis offers the most 
informative and controlled route for analysis. Given the near homogeneity of the Baltic posture 
and the isolation of Central Asia from Western influences, the Caucuses have been selected as an 
appropriate intermediate region. The region also benefits from its diversity of state actors, who 
 
15 Max Bader, “Fluid party politics and the challenge for democracy assistance in Georgia,” Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs 2, no. 2 (2008): 11. 
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maintain distinctive postures in relation to each other and to the Russian Federation. In order to 
acquire a divergent set of small state-Russian relations for comparison,, and on account of the 
need for extensive control precautions, Armenia and Georgia have been chosen as the research’s 
subjects. The advantages of this selection include various controls: 1) limited cross border 
conflict, 2) comparable political and economic systems, 3) lack of strategic energy resources, and 
4) analogous cultural and historical experiences. 
First, Armenia and Georgia have maintained cross-border stability with each other. This 
control excludes the possibility that their relations with Russia might be over-determined by the 
availability of Russian assistance with, or the lack thereof, in a potential conflict with the other 
case selection. Second, Armenia and Georgia enjoy comparable standards of civil and economic 
liberty and govern through analogous democratic institutions. Recently, Georgian’s standards 
have strengthened relative to Armenia, but throughout the evaluated chronology both states 
remained competitive on global freedom rankings.16 Armenians and Georgians, furthermore, 
share in the Orthodox religion. The equitability of Armenia and Georgia’s religious 
characteristics counterbalances pro-Orthodox biases in the development of Russian and post-
Soviet foreign policies, which are noticeably vulnerable to interference by domestic Orthodox 
churches and clerics.17 
A major resource allocation by only one actor would further weaken controls by adding 
new strategic considerations. Unlike Azerbaijan, neither Georgia nor Armenia are major energy-
resource producers, and both are dependent on imported fuel sources and domestic 
 
16 Freedom in the World. New York: Freedom House, 1991-2018. 
17 Robert Blitt, “Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 33, no. 2 (2011): 363-
463). 
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hydroelectricity production.18 This is an important control given the heightened likelihood of 
inter-state conflict in situations in which one of the evaluated states possesses strategic natural 
resources, such as oil.19 For both case selections, the energy issue in the region, however, 
remains within the purview of post-Soviet diplomatic trajectories, especially as it pertains to 
energy dependency. Further controls are imposed by this selection in the wider economic arena. 
The economies of both states are similar in size and composition, allowing for a more effective 
comparison of policy choices behind trade relations.  
The similarities between Armenia and Georgia also extend into shared historical 
experiences and developments under the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the First World War, 
Georgia and Armenia became sovereign states for the first time in five centuries. But these early 
republics were short-lived and ceased to exist when the Red Army successfully invaded and 
conquered the Caucasian republics during the Russian Civil War. The Bolsheviks subsequently 
subsumed Georgia and Armenia, despite extensive local resistance and mass repression, into the 
Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and later, as two of the Soviet Union’s 
twenty-one constituent republics.20 In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the Soviet 
government adopted the policy of Korenizatsiia, roughly manifesting as an ‘affirmative action’ 
program that encouraged the establishment of national elites within ethnic polities and the 
promotion of national languages throughout the constituent republics. Under this program and 
succeeding Soviet “minority” policies, Georgia and Armenia, already equipped with capable 
 
18 Demur Chomakhidze “Energy balance of Georgia,” Annals of Agrarian Science 12, no. 3, (2016). 
19 (Francesco Caselli, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner, “The geography of interstate 
resource wars,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 1, (2015). 
20 Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012), 233-66; Simon 
Payaslian, The History of Armenia (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007) 163-70.  
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cultural intelligentsias, asserted the supremacy of their respective ethnic majorities within the 
delimited territories of the constituent republics.21  
Ethnic minorities within the constituent republics were not always afforded the same 
privileges. This formal supremacy of the majority populations within the constituent republics 
fed into a cycle of formal repression and ethnic consolidation. In one illuminating instance, 
Soviet officials criminalized the linguistic and cultural expressions of the Mingrelian population 
in Georgia.22 Despite cultural concessions to the ethnic cores of the constituent republics, Soviet 
rule was heavy-handed in the chaotic aftermath of the civil war. Georgia suffered from endemic 
political confusion and rebellion, and consequently earned the distinction of suffering under the 
direct oversight of the Stalinist security officer, Lavrentiy Beria. Beria suppressed thousands of 
Christians, Mensheviks, artists, dissident Bolsheviks, and personal enemies in Georgia 
throughout his tenure.23 State-backed repression followed in Armenia, where the Bolshevik 
suppression of the Orthodox Church earned infamy for its exceptional brutality.24 
The stabilization that followed the consolidation of Stalin’s political control proved short-
lived with purges and economic imbalances persisting in the South Caucasus through the Second 
World War. Though directly unaffected by the German invasion, Georgia and Armenia were 
effectively conscripted into service by Stalin. Wartime fatalities and drastic economic 
reconfiguration reversed the demographic direction of Georgia as the country suffered from a 
loss of approximately a fifth of its population.25 Armenia suffered a similarly staggering loss rate 
with nearly 175,000 casualties.26 The rest of the Stalinist era brought little sociopolitical change 
 
21 Terry Martin,  The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923-1939, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 77.  
22 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 351 
23 ibid, 347-57.  
24 Payaslian, The History of Armenia, 177.  
25 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 363. 
26 Payaslian, The History of Armenia, 180. 
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aside from preliminary reconstruction through unbalanced central planning and industrialization, 
which was often a new reality in the South Caucasus. Relief from “extreme destitution” only 
arrived after de-Stalinization as wartime restrictions eased.27 Both countries became eager 
participants in the Soviet Union’s pervasive informal economy and enjoyed the partial benefits 
of industrialization and modernization, although economic stagnation soon followed in the 1980s 
and the region fell comparatively behind.28 Armenian and Georgian intellectual groups, still 
subject to occasional harassment, persisted in their efforts to consolidate the gains of 
Korenizatsiia and expand the cultural and territorial agendas of their respective republics.29 
Political power, however, remained the strict purview of the communist leadership as military-
intelligence authoritarians and conservative apparatchiks maintained power. As elsewhere in the 
Soviet Union, independence movements accelerated following the practical destruction of the 
Communist Party’s organizational power in September 1988.30 
As mentioned in the introduction, Georgia and Armenia exited the Soviet Union with 
comparable enthusiasm for secession. Both of the states boycotted the reformist March 1991 
Soviet referendum and voted overwhelmingly for independence in national plebiscites the same 
year. As an indication of their new separatist postures, Georgia and Armenia embraced an initial 
position of ambivalence, if not outright hostility, towards Russia, by refusing to join the new 
Commonwealth of Independent States.31 Universal hostility, however, was noticeably short-
lived. Over the next seventeen years, Tbilisi and Yerevan chartered divergent courses in their 
 
27 Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 369. 
28 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, (London and New York: The Royal 
Institution of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers, 1999), 120-2. 
29 Payaslian, The History of Armenia, 184-5. 
30 Richard Sakwa, “The Soviet collapse: Contradictions and neo-modernisation,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4, no. 
1 (2013): 67.  
31 Paul Kubieck, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: an Example of Failed Regionalism?” 
Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 242.  
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respective approaches to Moscow. The respective postures of Armenia and Georgia remain 
distinct with the former constructing a “cooperative” approach and the latter “defecting” from 
Russia.32 The divergent paths from the original common point of an adversarial posture, 
stretching from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present, constitute the basis 
and chronology of this research. The factors under examination, however, have antecedents and 
repercussions beyond the chronological framework that will be evaluated. 
Finally, the control selection suffers from one marked deficiency. Georgia shares a 
border—indeed, a violently contested border—with Russia and its unrecognized protectorates in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Armenia, though once subjected to the Kremlin, does not. This 
discrepancy creates potential complications. It is an established dictum in the literature, for 
example, that inter-state wars generally occur between neighbors.33 If the tendency for border 
conflict was a universal reality across the post-Soviet framework then this case selection would 
be rendered irrelevant. But neighborly antipathy, as previously described, is not a monolith 
across the post-Soviet framework. Several border states in the near abroad, even those with 
complex ethnic cleavages, remain enthusiastic partners of Russia, just as non-neighbors in the 
near abroad have defected to the West and adopted antagonistic postures towards Russia. In sum, 
borderland factors are obviously not the sole determiner, nor even the predominant one, in an 
analysis of determining factors. The sources of border tension, furthermore, do not conform 
necessarily to a model of Russian aggression. In the 2008 conflict, for example, culpability for 
much of the violent escalation appears to belong to Tbilisi. Beyond that, however, the evidence is 
not strong enough to support an assertive claim that Georgia deserves full responsibility for 
 
32 Spetschinsky and Bolgova, “Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial.”   
33 John A. Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” Journal 
of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (1995): 277.  
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failing to resolve the conflict-writ-large.34 In this case, the border caveat is a real input without 
direct applicability to the Armenian situation. Nevertheless, the sources for escalation in the 
Abkhazian crisis are still examined in the research as part of the wider narrative behind the 
direction of relations.  
The Dependent Variable 
  
Over the past thirty years, Armenia and Georgia have moved gradually towards their 
conflicting postures on Russia. In order to demonstrate the effect of the elected independent 
variables on the status of relations with Russia, this research monitors the participation of 
Armenia and Georgia in Russian-led or Western-led economic organizations, security 
agreements, and other bi-lateral agreements or multilateral institutions. Participation in the 
former indicates a proclivity for the “cooperation” route while involvement in the latter supports 
“defection.” In short, the dependent variable for this research is the “closeness and 
contentiousness of Russian relations in Georgia and Armenia—tracked by case country 
engagement with Russian or Western economic and security institutions and bi-lateral 
agreements.”  
It is also necessary to distinguish between cause and symptom. As mentioned, the 
proposed forces acting upon the status of the dependent variable are the constructed realities of 
the ruling elite and the trajectory of economic dependency on Russia. In this analysis, Armenia’s 
decision to form a 1993 free trade agreement with Russia captures a deliberate decision to 
deepen formal economies ties, but it does not axiomatically indicate Armenia’s economic 
dependence on Russia. Instead, the motivation behind the 1993 free trade agreement, illuminated 
through elite discourse and formal procedures, shows that the exigencies of economic 
 
34 Heidi Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 
IIFFMCG, Vol. II, 2009.  
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dependency were the principal causes for pursuing a free-trade agreement. The agreement itself, 
or attempts meanwhile, represents a deepening of institutional engagement as expressed in the 
dependent variable and determined by the independent variables, and might very well reinforce 
the trajectory.  
The formulation of institutional engagement as the bell-weather of Russian relations 
requires a nuanced analysis of the agreements. For example, participation in the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) indicates a strong political and economic affiliation with Russia. 
Indeed, the EAEU explicitly aims for “deep integration” between members and has been 
described by many experts as a conscious geopolitical counterweight to the European Union.35 In 
any comparison, membership of the EAEU would indicate a deep level of commitment to 
Russian relations. By contrast—participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS)—a regional commonwealth of post-Soviet states founded by Russia and likeminded 
successor states, demonstrates less de facto commitment to a pro-Russian position than 
participation in the EAEU or a CIS supplementary agreement, such as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA). Membership in the CIS proper is evidently less 
insightful as a metric of integration and affiliation. Georgia retained membership right up until 
the 2008 war and Ukraine remained a member for nearly five years after the Crimean invasion.36 
These examples exemplify how membership status in the CIS was retained despite pronounced 
deteriorations in bilateral relations. The post-Soviet institutional network thus forms a hierarchy 
of relevance for the purposes of this analysis. By extension, indications of “defection” in the 
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Caucasus region can be intuited by refusals to participate in Russian-led international 
organizations as well as by overtures towards and participation in Western-aligned institutions 
through agreements with NATO or the European Union. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged 
that there are degrees of engagement; Armenia and Georgia, for example, both received NATO 
Individual Partnership Action Plans, but expressed very different ambitions in their respective 
agreements.  
Certain scholars, however, have supplied relevant concerns to this selection of 
institutional engagement. Their chief objections stem from the belief, reminiscent of the 
‘conventional wisdom’ mentality, that many post-Soviet states were coerced into Russia’s nexus 
of international institutions and agreements. Naturally, such a conclusion undermines the 
serviceability of institutional engagement as a dependent variable. The objection is specifically 
relevant to this research as the claim of interference extends to Armenia’s entrance into the 
Eurasian Economic Union.37 Fortunately, academic analysis has begun to penetrate and push 
back, and the mutualism of agreements forms an important aspect of the research. 
This comparative research aims to challenge the claims made by the proponents of the 
‘conventional wisdom’ by offering an alternative analysis from the perspective of the post-Soviet 
states, rather than presume relations are principally determined by Russia’s behavior. For this 
purpose, the research identifies two variables that appear to determine the diplomatic trajectory 
of post-Soviet states in Transcaucasian.  
First, the comparative degree of economic and commercial interdependence between the 
post-Soviet Transcaucasian states and Russia impacts the direction of relations. It is no 
 
37 Stephen Jones, “The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy.” Journal of Communist Studies and 
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coincidence that Armenia, for example, remained highly dependent on the CIS export-import 
trade throughout the 1990s and concurrently engaged with Russian-aligned economic institutions 
and agreements.38 Georgia’s relations with Russia were likewise conditioned in this first period 
by heavy dependence, although as will be illustrated, Georgian elites consciously began to push 
against dependence and Russia on account of their own Euro-Atlantic (pro-Western) constructed 
realities.   
Although Georgia made overtures to Russia and initially joined the CIS, it became more 
independent from post-Soviet economic systems. Another prominent example of socioeconomic 
interdependence and its effects on diplomatic posturing is expressed by the relevance of 
expatriate and diaspora populations. Diaspora populations, both within Russia and throughout 
the world, are a frequent fixture of the post-Soviet world. The Armenian diaspora in Russia, in 
particular, looms large over Yerevan’s foreign and economic policy. Despite garnering less 
attention than Armenian-American expatriates, the diaspora population in Russia provides 
private remittances equivalent to nearly a fifth of Armenia’s GDP, at $2 billion per year.39 In 
addition, much of this “diaspora” involves a cycle of temporary migration to Russia followed by 
return to Armenia. Thus, the engagement of expatriates in Russia remains relevant for the 
Armenian government and Armenian political elites. Consequently, the Armenian government 
has struggled since independence to “maximize diaspora economic support for the new state, and 
to minimize its political involvement.”40 Georgia’s diaspora in Russia, though non-negligible, is 
magnitudes smaller than the Armenian diaspora, and exercises little direct influence on 
Georgia’s economic and political system. Significantly, many discrepancies in Transcaucasian 
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diasporas predate independence, undercutting any accusation that the “Russia decisions” are a 
simple reflection of Russian coercion.  
The second feature of this research adopts a constructivist foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
framework to analyze the impact of ‘constructed geo-political realities’ on the trajectory of 
regional relations. The essence of this approach frames the structures and perspectives of the 
international environment as socially constructed and therefore assumes that the principal actors 
are subject to pre-determined norms, precepts, and identity affiliations.41 This piece uses 
“constructed reality” to refer to the socially determined geopolitical viewpoints of the agents of 
post-Soviet foreign policy. David Patrick Houghton uses the example of Lyndon Johnson to 
demonstrate an identical concept, recalling an incident in which Lyndon Johnson rejected the 
usage of nuclear weapons in North Vietnam. Though his rejection might be taken as self-evident, 
it is clear that Johnson’s response was conditioned by international, cultural, and social norms 
about the use of nuclear weapons and the possible consequences of such an action.42 
The same strategy applied to the elite personalities of Armenian and Georgian foreign 
policy reveals much about the social and cultural paradigms behind elite decisions and the 
general sources and direction of foreign policy. For example, it is necessary to examine the 
considerable influence of Saakashvili on Georgian foreign policy as well as the socio-cultural 
imprints that shaped his international perspective. His role in the 2008 Georgian war, and the 
influence of “Euro-Atlantic” discourses on his geopolitical concept of Georgia deserves attention 
as a foil to claims of consistent Russian culpability and instigation.43 An identical standard of 
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comparative analysis extends to Armenian leaders, such as former president Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, and the social and cultural paradigms in Armenian foreign policy that influence policy 
choices. The objectives of leaders and foreign policy elites, and the social influences operating 
on the formulation of those objectives, therefore constitutes the focus of the FPA. In general, the 
foreign policy paradigms of elite actors in Armenia and Georgia have pervaded political loyalties 
and ensured a degree of constancy in the trajectory of relations. Leaders that have drifted outside 
the accepted boundaries of elite realities have been removed, and neither elections nor 
revolutions have succeeded in disrupting the direction of Russo-Transcaucasian relations. In 
sum, the “median” political position with respect to Russia and Europe, irrespective of national 
leadership, varies from state to state depending on the constructed realities of their chief actors. 
This comparative approach intends to challenge the presumption of Russian-directed relations 
and demonstrate how elite paradigms can determine the course of national foreign policy. 
Finally, the two hypotheses are not independent of each other. Economic interdependence and 
the development of elite constructed geo-political realities can be mutually reinforcing.  
  
Research Strategies and Outline 
  
As mentioned, systemic investigations of Transcaucasian and wider post-Soviet relations 
in the near abroad with Russia have tended to approach the topic from the perspective of Russian 
foreign policy. This project intends to amalgamate existing data and challenge the direction of 
analysis in the literature with a new emphasis on near abroad state-level examinations and the 
deeper sources of post-Soviet relations, such as elite identity. Individual case studies exist across 
the range of the aforementioned research factors and generally serve as the basis of the research. 
For example, Edmund Herzig provides a comparative and systematic analysis for the 
Transcaucasian states that captures the geopolitical and economic situation at the turn of the 
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millennia.44 Several case studies and academic works cover the Abkhazian and the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict with regard to the saliency of leadership influences in foreign policy.45 Further 
projects concur on the determining impact of social and cultural paradigms on the wider 
development of foreign policy both in Georgia and Armenia.46 As for expatriate populations in 
the region, reviews have examined their economic importance, but data is more preliminarily 
about the extent of their political clout.47 Broad post-Soviet migration data has been provided by 
initiatives like the Global Commission on International Migration and country-specific studies. 
Comprehensive regional economic information is broadly available in reports such as the IMF: 
Selected Issues/Country Reports, World Bank country update reports, and country-specific 
economic studies. Concurrently, speeches, interviews, and other media are employed to provide 
insight into the thinking of domestic elites.  
As illustrated in the introduction, the rest of this research is divided into three sections, a 
discussion, and a conclusion. The first section provides a broad outline of Georgian and 
Armenian relations with Russia and the West from independence to the present. The subsequent 
section argues that shared elite visions for the state in the post-Soviet space, so-called 
‘constructed realities,’ were decisive in determining national trajectories. The third section 
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evaluates the impact of economic dependence and the reaction of elites to that dependence by 
deepening or defecting engagement with Russia or the West. The research finishes with a 
discussion of how the two variables reinforce each other and a review of the key points of 
comparison before the conclusion.   
Section 1: Overview of Relations with Russia and the West 
 
Periodization 
For the purposes of analysis, Armenian and Georgian foreign policy are divided into 
three historical periods. The division helps highlight how the development of each state’s foreign 
policy was conditioned by an elite outlook that combined a concern for the economic 
dependence of the state with a geo-political constructed reality informed initially by 1) historical 
experience and later by an experience of the 2) post-Soviet security situation that tended to 
confirm the historical experience.  
During the first period (1991-2003), elites in both countries were highly insecure given 
domestic instability and national dependence on post-Soviet links. As a result, Armenia and 
Georgia entertained broad diplomatic postures with Russia and the West. Superficially, both 
states pursued similar international affiliations without overdone prejudice to one side. Russia 
was employed for the benefit of ruling elites in Georgia and then for the benefit of Armenia’s 
cause in Nagorno-Karabakh. But even during this period there were clear signs of developing 
long-term postures. Post-Soviet clashes, changing economies, and conflicting supranational 
visions induced Georgian elites to deleverage their security dependence and Armenian elites to 
increase their own. At the same time, elite understanding of foreign policy was informed by 
historical and recent experiences, reinforced by conflicts in Georgia’s secessionist territories and 
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the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s perceived position in these conflicts among 
elites would prove decisive in consolidating Transcaucasian constructed realities and the 
trajectory of foreign policy.   
The subsequent period (2003-2008) sharpened the previously subdued divergences 
between Yerevan and Tbilisi as Georgia moved towards the decisive moment in its ‘Russia 
decision.’ After the 2003 revolution, Georgian elites elevated their Euro-Atlantic outlook, 
complete with anti-Russian rhetoric, into definitive policy and clamored for membership in the 
Western bloc. Their fight against Russia —escalated into a failed 2008 war following 
provocations by Tbilisi. This moment marked Georgia’s decisive defection away from Russia 
and its post-Soviet networks. By contrast, Armenian elites, desiring to encourage FDI and retain 
Russia’s protection, deepened their dependence on Russia even as they made selective overtures 
to the West. Yerevan’s leadership, sinking into a Eurasian affiliation, never questioned 
Moscow’s position as its indispensable partner. 
The final period (2008-present) demonstrated the consolidation and durability of 
Georgia’s pro-Western and Armenia’s pro-Russian trajectory. For Armenia, the trends of the 
previous period were confirmed when Armenia abruptly abandoned plans for an agreement with 
the European Union and instead began to integrate into the Eurasian Economic Union. In this 
decision to affiliate with Russia’s post-Soviet framework, Armenian elites were as much driven 
by economic considerations as by enduring insecurity over Nagorno-Karabakh. Their 
constructed realities were again confirmed by war in 2016 with Azerbaijan and Russia’s 
subsequent provision of heavy weaponry. Since underlying insecurities, Russia’s historical 
protection, and economic integration with the Eurasian Economic Union have reinforced the 
outlook of Armenian elites, the Eurasian Economic Union remains Yerevan’s focus despite 
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revolution and political turmoil. Georgia, as well, has confirmed its Euro-Atlanticism in the 
aftermath of its 2008 break with Russia. As in Armenia, the consolidation of Euro-Atlanticism in 
Georgia’s foreign policy is not just a consequence of the war, but the entire experience of the 
post-Soviet period and prevailing economic trends that strengthen elite desire for membership in 
the Western framework. 
 
Diagram 1: Summary of Periodization 
 
Georgia 
 
Period Foreign Policy Dependence on Russia 
Period 1 (1991-2003) Euro-Atlantic (“pro-Western”) 
outreach, initially conditioned by 
dependence on Russia. 
High, but declining security 
and economic dependence.   
Period 2 (2003-2008) Integration efforts into Euro-
Atlantic structure, and anti-Russian 
policy. 
Low security and economic 
dependence.  
Period 3 (2008-present) Sustained Euro-Atlantic affiliation.  Very low security and 
economic dependence. 
 
Armenia  
 
Period Foreign Policy Dependence on Russia 
Period 1 (1991-2003) Complimentary multi-lateral 
outreach, initially conditioned by 
dependence on Russia. 
High but declining economic 
dependence and sustained 
security dependence (i.e. over 
Nagorno-Karabakh).  
Period 2 (2003-2008) Eurasian (“pro-Russian”) outreach 
encouraged by high dependence.  
High and growing economic 
dependence, sustained high 
security dependence.   
Period 3 (2008-present) Full Eurasian integration.  High economic and security 
dependence.  
 
 
Georgia in Period 1 
The initial attempts by the effectively independent states to construct national foreign 
policies seemed to mirror the popular anti-Russian energy expressed in the nationalist referenda. 
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At the time, Georgia was ruled by President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-1992), a Soviet-era 
dissident and the country’s premier radical nationalist. Amid the chaos of the USSR’s 
disintegration, Gamsakhurdia showed himself determined to purge Georgia of Russian and 
secessionist tendencies. He governed through a populist-authoritarian regime constructed upon a 
mixture of Georgian chauvinism and anti-Russian rhetoric that was anything but docile. His 
power collapsed in August 1991 and Georgia fell into civil war before succumbing to a 
triumvirate of prominent opposition politicians, though internal conflict persisted.  
The political order that succeeded Gamsakhurdia ended up in the control of the former 
Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003), who served as the unofficial 
executive before assuming the Georgian presidency in 1995. Under Shevardnadze, Georgia 
began to assume the pro-Western trappings that would eventually form a definitive fixture of 
Tbilisi's foreign policy. At the onset, however, such a break from Russia was impossible given 
Georgia’s economic dependence on post-Soviet networks and the confused security situation. 
Furthermore, the United States and the European powers had not formulated their own 
diplomacy in the near abroad region, and as a result, the West tended to default to a “Russia-
first” policy.  
Absent alternatives for international patronage of Georgian security, Shevardnadze 
cautiously turned to Moscow to help stem the tide of domestic and external conflict that was 
destabilizing Georgia. In October 1993, Shevardnadze brought Georgia into the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). Yeltsin’s long-term ambition was to turn the CIS into a 
supranational economic union and collective security alignment that could preserve and revive 
Soviet-era linkages. Shevardnadze was willing to play along if his compromise scored Georgia 
assistance in the repression of rebellious Gamsakhurdian loyalists, as well as stabilized Georgia’s 
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free-falling economy.48 The following year, Shevardnadze and President Yeltsin signed a 
package of military treaties that legitimized the presence of three Russian bases with the express 
purpose of stabilizing Georgia, protecting Russian speakers, and assisting in the build-up of the 
Georgian military. It was with Russian support, weapons, and fuel that Tbilisi succeeded in its 
repression of Gamsakhurdia’s militias.49 Yerevan as well would soon share in Russia’s military 
beneficence. As a result of Russian support, Georgia agreed to assist with Russia’s operations 
against the Chechnya separatists and accepted CIS peace-keeping forces in disputed Abkhazia, 
then under a 1994 ceasefire. Significantly, the apex of Russo-Georgian relations, perceptible 
around 1994-5, coincided with the apex of Georgian economic and security dependence on 
Russia.  
Despite the rapprochement, Moscow constituted only one pillar of Shevardnadze’s 
balanced diplomacy and it was very unpopular among the populace and political elites. In fact, 
Georgian elites viewed the CIS in a similar vein as the “conventional wisdom” proclaims: a 
cover by the Kremlin to “colonize the near abroad.”50 When Georgia stabilized, however, 
Shevardnadze pursued membership in various Western organizations. Georgia joined NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 before a more concerted outreach in the late 1990s 
to the IMF, the Council of Europe, and the World Bank, while slowly distancing itself from 
Russia.51 New economic opportunities were also attracting heretofore uninterested Westerners in 
Transcaucasia and increasing Georgian connectivity to the West, though NATO remained 
reticent on Caucasian entanglement as Georgia was still of secondary importance to the West. It 
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was a curious dilemma for Georgia, as Stephen Jones explained, that the “West was desirable but 
not attainable, and Russia was undesirable but not alienable.”52 The pressures that determined 
Georgia’s definitive split from Russia, nevertheless, were clearly pushing Tbilisi away from 
Moscow. 
In 1997, Georgia joined three other CIS members—Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—
in the creation of GUAM, or what was to become the Organization for Democratic and 
Economic Development (ODED). GUAM represented those states in the post-Soviet space that 
were distancing themselves from Moscow and seeking to prevent the transformation of the CIS 
into a more integrated supra-national union.53 The tilt away from Russia, presaged in 1997 with 
GUAM on the international stage, accelerated on the ground as Shevardnadze tacitly approved a 
seven-day militia war in Abkhazia in 1998 with anti-CIS overtones, and then arrived in the 
spring of 1999 when Shevardnadze (along with his fellow GUAM members) refused to renew 
the Collective Security Treaty. In November 1999, Georgia then succeeded in forcing Russia to 
agree to close down its military bases located in Georgian territory at the OSCE Summit in 
Istanbul.54 The departure of Russian border guards and the transference of ten military 
installations, an arrangement first agreed upon in the depths of Georgia’s civil war, was also 
attained at this summit, though some bases remained occupied. 
For Georgia, the shift away from Russia was directly coinciding with a new diplomatic 
and geo-political push to the West. Shevardnadze spoke, for the first time, about a plan for 
Georgian membership in NATO and then followed his declarations with an institutional 
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deepening; Georgia joined the Council of Europe (two years before Armenia) and the 
Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). Military assistance from NATO 
was plentiful, including joint exercises, military resource management, free training, and direct 
equipment. NATO members were also subsidizing agreed Georgian takeovers of Russian 
military installations—procured during the nadir of Russian hard power.55  
From a conceptual standpoint, Georgian elites and officials were formulating the 
trajectory of their foreign policy, culminating in various national security documents and 
resolutions that sought integration into the Western nexus. At the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, 
Shevardnadze declared that he “strongly welcomed [the] further eastward expansion of the 
Alliance” and asserted outright “that Georgia is determined to be a full member of NATO and is 
resolved to work hard to prepare for this historic mission.”56  But under Shevardnadze’s 
administration the complete break from Russia was decelerated and the road to NATO and the 
EU unclear; there was no doubt what bloc Georgia was leaning towards but the official will did 
not yet forcibly pursue the end goal.  
 
Georgia in Period 2 
Following mass outrage over evidence of electoral rigging in the 2003 election, 
Shevardnadze was forced to resign by his soon-to-be successor, Mikhail Saakashvili. The 
victorious elite envisioned overcoming Georgia’s residual dependence on Russia and then 
committing to the West. This was very unlike Armenia, where elites had so far accepted—in 
fact, deepened—dependence on Russia rather than challenge it within the context of perceived 
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economic and security needs. For Georgia, the Soviet-era links were something to be supplanted, 
not nurtured. These aspirations were embodied in the person and coterie of Mikhail Saakashvili, 
who steered much of the so-called “Rose Revolution” and scored the presidency in non-
competitive presidential elections that followed in January 2004..57  
Georgia’s “Russian decision” was looming, and it would soon defect from Russia’s 
international framework. A furious drive to attract the Western bloc then followed with 
Saakashvili courting the Western bloc and re-calibrating Georgia’s international commitments. 
In March 2004 he gave complete access for NATO to use Georgia as a supply depot, and then in 
November drastically increased Georgia’s military deployment in Afghanistan. Though the 
initiative generally came from Saakashvili, he was helped by the enthusiasm of the Bush 
administration in their search for a Freedom Agenda success story.58 Saakashvili and his allies 
envisioned Georgia’s compliance with NATO standards by 2008, and had similar expectations 
for membership in the European Union, although the latter enthusiasm soon abated.59  
NATO, therefore, earned the lion’s share of Georgian attention. In 2004, Georgia signed 
the first ever NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). IPAPs were designed to tailor 
NATO cooperation with partner countries to specific regional circumstances. Georgia’s IPAP 
opened with the explicit declaration that Georgia’s strategic objective was Euro-Atlantic 
integration with full membership of NATO and integration with the European Union. No 
mention of fostering amicable relations with Moscow was included; in fact Russia’s only 
appearance in the document was a curt note expressing Georgia’s desire to fulfill the terms of the 
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1999 Istanbul agreement, which had included Russian military withdrawal from Georgia.60 
Georgia’s IPAP offered much more than previous vehicles of collaboration, such as the 
Partnership for Peace or the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process. Here was an 
institutional mechanism, offered by NATO, that conspicuously declared for NATO membership 
and against Russia.  
Whether or not the Western bloc would permit total integration remained ambiguous. At 
first, indications looked encouraging. Georgia’s IPAP was the prelude to a deeper institutional 
dialogue called “Intensified Dialogue,” offered by NATO in September 2006 and commencing 
in December. This process had previously been employed in Eastern Europe prior to 
membership. At the same time, however, NATO officials were sending mixed signals, and 
warning that the secessionist issue in South Ossetia and Abkhazia required resolution. Still, the 
Georgian elite placed their hopes in a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which failed to 
materialize at the much anticipated 2008 Bucharest Summit. Instead, NATO promised 
Saakashvili eventual ascension, but without an immediately accessible path. Meanwhile, at the 
summit, President Putin affirmed a ‘red-line’ that rejected further NATO expansion on Russia’s 
border. He explained his decision by arguing that NATO’s promises to Russia that enlargement 
was “not directed against Russia” were insufficient.61 Indeed, in Georgian rhetoric the role of 
NATO was as much about protection as patronage. 
Saakashvili’s maneuverings in the April 2008 summit gave way to a dramatic escalation 
that same summer. Saakashvili had long been escalating his confrontation with the breakaway 
secessionist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with sanctions, proxies, and infiltration. 
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Russia was responding, especially during the Kosovo controversy and the Bucharest Summit, by 
threatening to recognize the former Georgian territories as independent states. The escalatory 
crisis, ripe with skirmishes, sanctions, and militia violence, reached a climax in August 2008 
when Saakashvili initiated military operations and the now-confident Kremlin came to the 
assistance of the separatists. The 2008 war lasted only a few days, and concluded when Russian 
forces forced the Georgians out from South Ossetia and Abkhazia and began pushing into 
Georgian territory before a ceasefire was declared. Russia followed its victory by recognizing 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.62  
Unsurprisingly, the 2008 war portended no rapprochement in Georgian-Russian relations. 
The West looked on Georgia as the sympathetic victim of Russian aggression, and the 
increasingly authoritarian Saakashvili was still firmly in control. Georgia had also succeeded in 
overcoming Georgia’s dependence on Russia. Natural gas flowed into Georgia from Azerbaijan 
while domestic hydroelectric power enabled Tbilisi to overcome a slate of economic sanctions 
imposed by Moscow between 2005 and 2007.63 With dependence and relations on the decline, 
Saakashvili finalized the “Russia decision” with Georgia’s defection from Russian-led 
institutions in the near abroad. By 2009, Georgia was unprepared for further engagement in the 
CIS, which had degraded from its supranational ambitions into a forum to discuss issues of “low 
politics” in the near abroad.64 Even this degree of post-Soviet linkage, especially as it had been 
designed by Russia, was not to be encouraged. Saakashvili withdrew from the CIS in April 
2009.65 
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Georgia in Period 3 
Georgia’s political scene has been unstable, but its diplomatic trajectory is constant. 
Under Saakashvili, Georgia continued its outreach to the West. Despite the fact that Western 
enthusiasm for Georgian membership had been dampened by Tbilisi's role in the 2008 war, the 
Obama Administration recognized Georgia’s interests in its 2011 National Security Concept. In 
2014, NATO invited Georgia into the "Enhanced Opportunities Partners" (EOP) group that 
offered enhanced cooperation with NATO facilities and the security partnership has continued to 
deepen. The United States has also provided Tbilisi with over $750 million in military assistance 
since the 2008 war (Mrachek, 4). To date, however, no MAP has been provided by NATO to 
Georgia, even though NATO repeatedly recognizes that Georgia’s membership is inevitable.66 
Saakashvili subsequently re-focused Georgia’s foreign policy, and began negotiating with the 
European Union for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) through the recently 
launched Eastern Partnership (EaP).67  
In 2011, Georgian businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili began to organize the Georgian 
opposition, chafing under divided leadership and Saakashvili’s growing tendency for 
authoritarianism. His opposition, known as the Georgian Dream (GD), overcame state-backed 
harassment to win the 2012 parliamentary election and take power.68 Ivanishvili himself stood 
down in 2013 for backroom influence, but GD represented a wider constituency of elite opinion. 
They argued for a ‘normalization’ of relations with Russia and began to prosecute Saakashvili's 
ministers. But this normalization, in reality, was no reversal of the ‘Russia decision.’ GD 
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resolutely affirmed the Western foreign policy even as it made noises about relaxing the standoff 
with Russia. Relations with Russia were incompletely restored with the appointment of a Special 
Representative for Relations with Russia.69 Economic relations and humanitarian concerns were 
'officially' depoliticized in 2012.70 But even the gentle détente has been unstable, and tensions 
cyclically remerge.  
 
Armenia in Period 1:  
Georgia was not alone in spending its formative years pursuing a “balanced” foreign 
policy. Armenia, facing similar internal traumas and external dependencies, struck out its own 
“multi-vectored” foreign policy, known as the ‘complementarity’ policy. President Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, Armenia’s inaugural president, was the architect of this policy and its chief 
practitioner until his downfall in 1998. During his administration, he built the policy around “not 
uniting to any political or military block.”71 For example, Ter-Petrosyan refused to make an issue 
out of the Armenian Genocide in an effort to normalize relations with Turkey (an initiative that 
soon crumbled), chased cooperation with Iran, and courted Western assistance to shore up the 
legitimacy of Armenia’s shaky independence.  
Armenia’s overtures to the West exhibited none of the same enthusiasm shown by their 
Georgian neighbors. In 1994, Armenia joined NATO’s new program, Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), which called for “promoting reforms, increasing stability, and enhancing security 
relationships both between and among Partner countries and NATO.”72 Armenian membership, 
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however, was a reaction to Azerbaijan's earlier ascension to PfP and attributable to the belief 
among Armenian elites that Baku could not be allowed to outflank Armenia in the international 
arena.73 Given its intimate security and economic dependence on Russia, Armenia’s relations 
with NATO were cordial, but not seriously progressing.  
Under Ter-Petrosyan, however, Armenia only had found consistent disappointment in its 
attempts to branch out. The basic premise of this failure was generally one of limited interest; 
Armenia had few real connections with those which it pursued. For example, many elites after 
independence desired more engagement with the Arab states, but such aspirations were severely 
restricted by a lack of economic common interest, as well as by Armenia’s commitment to 
Nagorno-Karabakh in its struggle against Azerbaijan, which was also orchestrating a blockade of 
Armenia with Turkish assistance. Inside the OSCE Minsk Group, officials fretted that Armenia’s 
position was weakening as constituent states grew their stakes in the Azerbaijani oil industry. 
Concurrently, the United States was encouraging its own interests in Azerbaijan, and in 1996 the 
State Department clarified its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.74 Limited cooperation 
was managed with Iran, and would eventually grow, but such outreach was under constant 
pressure from various sources; border skirmishes, overtures to Israel, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
crisis, and Iranian skepticism towards the practicality of Armenia’s complementary foreign 
policy.  
Despite the sincerity of Ter-Petrosyan’s overtures, in reality Armenia was drifting back 
into the Russian camp. Unlike Georgia, the “multi-vector” foreign policy of Armenia, in part due 
to the conflicting geo-political views of Armenian and Georgian elites in the post-Soviet security 
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situation, enabled Russia to assume a privileged role as the provisional guarantor of Armenian 
security. Whereas Shevardnadze had controversially appealed to Russia in order to save his state 
from anarchy, Ter-Petrosyan signed up for the CIS in December 1991 without fanfare and the 
Armenian parliament approved it with ease. The next year, Armenia acceded to the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty (CST) and allowed Russian access to military installations in Armenia 
with an additional basing agreement approved in the summer of 1994.75 Central to this deepening 
of security relations was the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Armenia supported the 
majority-ethnic Armenian population against the Republic of Azerbaijan and their informal allies 
in Ankara. During the course of the conflict, especially in its high intensity concluding years, 
Armenia was completely dependent upon Russia for economic and wartime necessities, 
including a significant number of arms transfers.76 Armenian elites tended to react to this 
dependency by deepening their involvement in Russia’s international framework. In 1997, Ter-
Petrossian signed a military-security alliance with Russia. Nevertheless, he remained committed 
to widening the complimentary policy, and sought compromise and conciliation wherever 
possible to ‘break out’ of Armenia’s isolation. 
Ter-Petrosyan was deposed in a 1998 parliamentary coup that elevated his prime 
minister, Robert Kocharyan, into the presidency.77 Kocharyan, who was also the former 
president of the contested Nagorno-Karabakh republic, never challenged Russia’s role as the 
‘indispensable nation.’ Instead, during Kocharyan’s administration, Armenia sought 
developmental and symbolic engagement with the West, while concurrently deepening its 
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practical integration into the post-Soviet networks maintained by Moscow. In effect, Armenia 
could earnestly participate in the Council of Europe (2001), the PfP Planning and Review 
Process (2002) or the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (2004) without threatening its 
Russian pillar. As American policy came under review after September 11, Armenia was offered 
many more opportunities to engage with and receive support from the West’s security 
framework. Yerevan managed these opportunities to maximize assistance and military 
cooperation without irritating Russia; the results were very restrained. Compared to Georgia, 
Armenia’s investment in Western outreach was considerably more muted when compared to 
Georgia’s commitment. For example, Kocharyan sent 50 men under Polish command to Iraq in 
contrast to Georgia’s 850-strong expeditionary force.78 The training programs that were 
prioritized by Armenian elites with NATO, furthermore, were underfunded, a concern later 
expressed by Defense Minister Tevzadze.79 
Armenian officials who orchestrated Yerevan’s participation in Western programs that 
elicited military training and assistance, economic aid, and humanitarian support succeeded in 
avoiding Moscow’s ire by re-affirming Yerevan’s official alignment with Russia. Kocharyan 
himself asserted that Armenia could have no place within NATO, thereby limiting Armenia’s 
participation in NATO to collaborative, not integrative, activities. In December 2002, the 
Armenian parliament evinced that reality when it approved equity-for-debt swaps that transferred 
control of five Armenian defense enterprises to Russian proprietorship in exchange for $95 
million in debt relief.80 That same year, Armenia and Russia agreed to further military 
collaboration. Russian officials, including then-foreign minister Igor Ivano, could openly call 
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Armenia "Russia's only ally in the south."81 The face of the complimentary policy was becoming 
less believable.  
 
Armenia in Period 2:  
Under Kocharyan and his ruling party, the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), 
Armenian foreign policy more clearly evinced a fundamental dependence on the “Russia first.” 
Negotiations with the European Union were deemed a pressing matter, but that approach 
remained cautious. Armenia’s 2006 non-binding Action Plan aimed for linking reform with an 
ambiguous “stake in the EU’s Internal Market” and gradual involvement in “EU policies and 
programs.” 82 Progress was slow and contentious.  
Negotiations with the EU were prioritized but it was by no means the only outreach. For 
example, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) accepted Armenia’s IPAP in 2005, but in contrast to 
Georgia, Armenia’s IPAP was strictly delimited in its ambition.83 President Kocharyan and his 
2008 successor, Serzh Sargsyan, frequented the viewpoint that joining NATO “would barely 
improve the country’s security, and [it would] affect its relations with neighboring countries.”84 
These statements competed with IPAPs that envisioned “European integration” as had been 
promised to Georgia.85 But the direction of policy seemed to back up Kocharyan and Sargsyan. 
Armenian-Russian security collaboration intensified with a flurry of military agreements. Within 
the CIS and CSTO, Armenia actively supported the supranational framework. It held the rotating 
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chairmanship of the CSTO from 2007 to 2008 and assigned a full unit to the Collective Rapid 
Reaction Force (CRRF) in 2009.86 Perhaps most decisively, Armenia’s economic dependence on 
Russia dramatically increased during this period, partially as a result of pre-existing conditions as 
well as deliberate encouragement of Russian investment and ownership of strategic industries.  
 
Armenia in Period 3:  
In September 2013, Sargsyan announced plans to abandon negotiations for an 
Association Agreement (AA) and committed instead to the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) with 
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. European officials believed the defection was principally 
driven by security concerns, not economic motivations.87 This was only half-true. In reality, 
Armenia’s economic configuration invited further integration with Russia. Furthermore, Russia 
had deftly provoked the concerns of Armenian elites on Nagorno Karabakh, and they were 
destined to default onto their conventional strategy of strengthening ties with Russia. Their 
reservations were not without economic cause. NATO and EU member states had mostly 
prohibited selling offensive weapons to Armenia through an OSCE embargo.88 As always, 
Armenian elites saw Russia as the only source of stability. Armenia’s “U-turn” will be explained 
in further detail in subsequent sections.  
 Membership in the ECU implied a statement of bloc affiliation as definitive as Georgia’s 
guarantees from NATO or agreements with the EU. The common economic space evolved into 
the supranational Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was to facilitate “deep integration” 
towards a single market behind a common external tariff. Sargsyan’s decision sent a clear signal 
 
86 Richard Weitz, Assessing the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities (US Army 
War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018), 2, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3661.pdf. 
87 Del Medico, “A Black Knight in the Eastern Neighbourhood,” 11. 
88 MacFarlane, Two Years of the Dream, 10.  
  39 
on Armenia’s Russia decision; wider integration and cooperation with Russia was Yerevan’s 
practical destiny. Armenia’s economic configuration and the security concerns of foreign policy 
actors had consistently pointed to Russia; the decision to break from the AA process and join the 
EAEU resolved the multi-vectored policy conclusively in Moscow’s favor.    
Armenia’s security did not improve in the immediate aftermath of EAEU membership. 
Tensions with Azerbaijan along the contested border continued to escalate, and Azerbaijan was 
still receiving arms deliveries from a 2010 agreement with Russia. Putin, however, did provide 
Armenia with a 2015 emergency loan to acquire modern weaponry before a short and 
inconclusive four-day war erupted with Azerbaijan in April 2016.89 In response, Moscow sent 
huge weapon supplies to Armenia after the war. Russia was keen not to appear as an unreliable 
ally within the EAEU and the CSTO.90 Despite controversy within Armenia, the Eurasian Union 
has proved a durable cornerstone of Armenia’s ‘Russia decision.’ In April and May 2018, 
protesters ousted the incumbent government in the ‘Velvet Revolution’ and brought the EAEU-
skeptic, Nikol Pashinyan, into the premiership. In no time, however, Armenia resumed its normal 
posture in the EAEU. 
Given its comprehensive commitment to the EAEU, Armenia was unhappily permitted 
by Russia and the EAEU to continue negotiating limited agreements with the European Union. 
The EU still constitutes a sizable, if diminishing, portion of Armenia’s trade. The sustained 
economic relationship culminated with the 2017 Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership 
Agreement, agreed under the more Russophilic Sargsyan administration. To appease vocal 
Russian opposition, negotiators removed anything that might contradict EAEU terms. In fact, the 
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agreement was consciously framed as a bridge between the EU and the EAEU.91 With Yerevan 
committing, rather than defecting, from the EAEU, Armenia has clearly made its Russia decision 
for the foreseeable future.  
 
Section 2: Constructed Realities 
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
Small States and Weak States 
For much of the post-Soviet period, Armenia and Georgia were characterized as small 
and weak states. Small states are defined based on specific criteria ranging from geographic size 
to military strength. Small states are generally dependent upon the military power of stronger 
countries and the security framework more powerful states offer to smaller ones.92 Weak states 
or “fragile states” require a more rigorous definition. The World Bank describes a fragile state as 
characterized “by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous post-conflict transitions, weak 
security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and insufficient 
mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority.”93 In the international system, weak 
states tend to have small economies, high dependence, little military power, and less interest in 
the wider affairs.94 As newly secessionist states, Armenia and Georgia have been characterized 
as weak states.95 Georgia’s weakness was also varyingly ascribed to the conflict between 
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nationalists and separatists, Tbilisi's failure to meet democratic transition goals, and Russian 
meddling.96 Today that appellation is less applicable to both states.  
 
Small States, Weak States, and Patronage 
Small states have several options within the international system. They may forswear 
affiliation and remain outside of formal alliances. Another option is to attempt to align with a 
strategic alliance or bloc. In neo-realist realist terms, the small state alignment is indicative of 
balancing (allying with one side to balance and danger of another) or bandwagoning (allying 
with the source of danger). Realists have historically argued that the balance of power was the 
determining factor. Stephen Walt’s alternative, by contrast, stresses the ‘balance of threat’ to 
small states rather than the global balance of power.97 An exclusive use of this framework, 
however, obscures key determiners in the construction of an alliance, such as shared cultural or 
historical affiliation.98  
Constant across all these frameworks is the search for patronage. Small states develop 
their foreign policy orientation in order to induce its prospective larger partner to support the 
small state. They may employ various strategies—symbolic, strategic, propagandistic—in 
framing membership to court their alliance. In certain examples, small states conduct ‘political 
penetration’ whereby they lobby foreign governments for favor. Small states may also leave 
former alliances and seek patronage and protection from a new source.99  
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Weak states have their own set of options. In addition to political penetration, they may 
project harmlessness, promote an inviting national image (i.e. defender of democracy), or invite 
the armed forces of a great power as a form of deterrence or entrapment.  
 
Constructivism and Actors 
Constructivism in international relations can be understood broadly as an analytical lens 
that incorporates actors overlooked in traditional realism and neo-liberal international relations. 
While the primacy of states within the international system is still recognized, unlike realism, 
constructivists consider state agency as conditioned by other actors, including political elites and 
civil society. Constructivists also challenge the rational actor model employed by neo-liberals 
and realists and prefer to view states as composites of their actors or social actors themselves.100 
As for foreign policy elites, constructivists view their ‘rational’ outlook as conditioned by 
internal argumentation and socio-cultural determiners.101 Current literature on the construction of 
foreign policy indicates that outsized influence on national diplomacy is afforded to individual 
leaders in small and fragile states.102 As a result, existing literature on the South Caucasus tends 
to emphasize the monopolization of foreign policy by the leadership and elite personalities.103 
 
 Constructed Realities 
Over the last twenty years, scholars of the South Caucasus have focused increasingly on 
the instrumental role played by cultural determiners and national identity in foreign policy. Since 
the Soviet center had monopolized foreign policy, post-Soviet states had little, if any, experience 
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with developing a national strategy. As a result, elites in the near abroad had to establish national 
interests and assign value to those interests. Ilya Prizel argues that in the post-Soviet space 
political discourse around national identity—a social construction inherited or  developed by 
elites—served as a “reference pool” for framing national interests and conducting foreign 
policy.104 Contrary to realist interpretations, national strategy was not determined by evaluations 
of the balance of power, but by elite decisions based on national identity, which allowed for a 
post-independence redefinition of the nation’s cultural affiliation, ‘appropriate’ borders, and 
traditional patrons and enemies. In this sense, elites in the near abroad had to construct the 
reality: what their state would look like (i.e. in territorial terms) and who it would associate with 
(i.e. in supranational/developmental terms) by drawing on their own understanding of their pre-
independence past as well as their unfolding experiences in the post-Soviet period. This is the 
basis of the constructed reality—it is a shared elite vision of the identity of the state within the 
post-Soviet space as informed by the national identity.  
In Armenia and Georgia, constructed realities have restricted the flexibility of national 
strategy by placing an identity-related value on foreign policy objectives. For example, the elite 
constructed realities in both countries offer no chance of conciliation over either Abkhazia/South 
Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh—those who attempt concessions run the risk of widespread 
political alienation—thereby respectively reinforcing the Soviet-era suspicions of Georgian elites 
vis-a-vis Moscow and Armenia’s historical dependence on Russia. As a result, elites prejudice 
policy and discourse towards one bloc and away from another in order to attain that vision. Over 
time, events on the ground can reinforce the constructed reality, such as when the projected ally 
fulfills its duty, or the projected enemy disturbs the peace. By reviewing the motivations behind 
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the leadership and the effect of those motivations on institutional engagement and outreach, this 
section contends that constructed realities have been decisive variables in determining Georgia’s 
defection and Armenia’s cooperation with Russia.  
 
Section 2A: Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic Constructed Reality   
 
Georgia: Euro-Atlanticism 
In 2004, President Saakashvili declared his pride in Georgia for “giving me an 
overwhelming mandate to return Georgia to its rightful destiny as a responsible member of the 
European community.”105 Saakashvili’s phrase connected a statement of identity—Georgia’s 
Europeanness—with a foreign policy trajectory aimed at ‘returning’ Georgia to Europe.  
 Georgia’s obsession with the West is a thoroughly modern creation. Georgian 
intellectuals in the late 19th century introduced European ideas during the reformist reign of Tsar 
Alexander II and then transmitted a European identity onto Georgia’s valorized past. In 
particular, the work of the early 20th century intellectual tsiperkhasnteslni group was 
instrumental in combining Georgia’s historical experience with an idealization of the abstract 
West. Elite-driven discourse constructed a Georgian who was a "Christian, European, and a 
warrior-martyr” against the Muslim ‘other,’ which is a theme that has been confirmed by an 
official post-independence push away from Soviet-era triumphalism and towards a semi-
mythologized narrative around Georgia’s medieval history.106 Growing intellectual and elite 
fascination with the West, generally for nationalist ends, presaged rising European involvement 
in the region, particularly during the First World War. When the Bolsheviks invaded at the 
height of the Russian Civil War, the Georgian elite appealed to the Allies for assistance, but 
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earned no support. Despite the West’s inability to provide practical assistance, however, elites 
and intellectuals remained attached to Western ideas and drove a European identity into the 
Georgian mainstream throughout the 20th century.107 The emerging affinity with the West was 
reinforced by the relative stagnation of Georgian economic and political life under the Soviet 
Union. Rejecting communism became inseparably linked with Georgian self-identification as 
European.108 During the 1970s and 1980s, as Soviet control loosened, the pro-Western image 
was confirmed, and anti-Soviet nationalist leaders made appeals for NATO membership long 
before the 2008 Bucharest Summit.109 Post-Soviet elites were the inheritors of this intellectual 
legacy. Western identity was further strengthened by the developmental appeal of the first world 
and the effect of this is apparent by the radical influence of Western neoliberalism within 
Georgian domestic policy.110  
 The underside of elite self-identification with Europe is anti-Russianism. In the Georgian 
political imagination, Russia has abused its position as natural patron in historical and post-
Soviet contexts. The intellectual mainstream mixes harsh condemnations of 19th century Russian 
territorial imperialism in Georgia with the sobering existence of living under the Soviet regime. 
Indeed, Georgia enjoyed a consistent reputation as one of the most nationalistic Soviet republics, 
especially in the post-Stalin period when pro-independence demonstrations were regularly 
suppressed.111 Another decisive component has been the integration of anti-Russianism into the 
discourse of Georgian ethno-nationalism, generally over the question of the secessionist states, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
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Political elites in Tbilisi have a reliable history of defending an uncompromising, even 
chauvinistic, view of territorial integrity. During the brief independent republic of Georgia, the 
governing effectively Mensheviks orchestrated the annexation of Abkhazia into Georgia and 
justified it on medieval claims, while a South Ossetiatian uprising in 1918 against the Menshevik 
government earned a brutal repression by the Georgian central government.112 Even after the 
Soviet victory in the civil war, Georgians succeeded in reducing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
autonomous republics within the Georgian SSR by the 1930s.113 In both states, Tbilisi's Georgian 
discriminatory ethno-nationalist policies stirred tension with local populations who prized their 
cultural identities. Even when formal discriminatory policies were abolished, informal 
discrimination persisted. Georgian elites were also wary of a Kremlin that had already tried to 
subvert their territorial integrity by experimenting with formal Abkhazia and South Ossetiatian 
autonomy. Gorbachev’s glasnost enabled competing nationalist expressions as anti-secession and 
secessionism quarreled in the public square until both conflicts escalated into open warfare when 
Tbilisi tried (and failed) to suppress militarily the defiant local governments in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.114 At least in South Ossetia, Georgian elites, in particular Gamsakhurdia, 
suspected Russian assistance was the decisive element in Georgia’s defeat and withdrawal. 
Events had added another unresolved grievance towards Russia and projected it into the role of 
partitioner. Saakashvili, for example, accused Russia before the 2008 war of trying to turn 
Georgia into Cyprus, permanently divided.115 Tbilisi's commitment to re-unification has retained 
its potency; Georgian elites even escalated disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia into open 
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warfare on two further occasions in 1998 and 2008, the latter with Russia as the principal 
adversary and the West as the rhetorical and material patron.  
The inseparability of each of these threads—Western identity, anti-Russianism, and 
ethno-nationalism—gives cause to analyzing the elite outlook as a coherent and interconnected 
whole. Each element of this constructed reality is related to another in the discourse—the dream 
of restoring an integral Georgian nation, Russia’s alleged support for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, Georgia’s default Western identity and the subsequent appeal for Euro-Atlantic 
protection and integration. An examination of Georgian national security concept documents—
before 2004 there was no official national security concept, though many documents were 
produced with an overarching vision for foreign policy—evinces how each of these elements 
were considered inseparable. In the 2000 document, Georgia and the World: A Vision and 
Strategy for the Future, the foreign policy goals of Georgia for independence and territorial 
integrity (officially ‘national unity) are placed against a backdrop of historical recriminations 
against Russia and praise for Western Europe, an express desire to “reconcile the people and 
leaders of Abkhazia, Georgia and the South Ossetia regions to life within the Georgian state,” 
and a long-term goal to integrate into the "major institutions of the European and Euro-Atlantic 
communities."116 Subsequent national security concepts produced by the Georgian government 
and ratified by the parliament, as a result of the Rose Revolution, confirm in stronger terms the 
coherence of Euro-Atlanticism by declaring the necessity of responding to “military aggression 
by the Russian Federation...the occupation of Georgian territories” by deepening Georgia’s 
already extant membership in the “Euro-Atlantic space.”117 For the Georgian elites, the 
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formulation of foreign policy therefore resolves around an integrated doctrine of Georgian 
territorial integrity, European identity, and anti-Russianism.  
To varying degrees, every post-Soviet Georgian leader and administration has 
sympathized with the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality. In this sense, Euro-Atlanticism has 
existed in gradations depending on the administration and the regional situation, but the 
“median” or fundamental premise of the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality has remained stable:  
the consummate vision behind Georgia’s Euro-Atlanticism constructed reality imagines a 
Western-affiliated Georgia, protected by the Euro-Atlantic alliance structure from a neo-
imperialist Russia that seeks to undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia. The durability of 
this viewpoint, despite domestic political turnover, is among the most persuasive arguments that 
post-independence Russo-Georgian relations have not been exclusively determined by Russian 
aggression. This is particularly apparent given how instrumental Euro-Atlanticism has been in 
initiating policies that contribute to a ‘defection.’  
 
Euro-Atlanticism in the Political Leadership 
The first independent Georgian administration under Gamsakhurdia represented a radical 
manifestation of the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality. Although Georgia was still heavily 
dependent on post-Soviet linkages and the political situation was entirely unsuitable for outright 
defection, Gamsakhurdia appealed to the West to rescue Georgia, and sought through military 
force the attainment of Georgia’s territorial integrity. He also openly contemplated NATO 
membership as a measure that would ensure Georgian unity and protect against Russia.118 His 
refusal to join the CIS naturally followed from his Euro-Atlantic position; Gamsakhurdia did all 
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he could to emphasize Georgian independence in opposition to Moscow. Russian observers were 
keen to emphasize this point when Gamsakhurdia reversed his position upon losing control of his 
country in December 1991, ridiculing Gamsakhurdia’s attachment to the "beloved West."119  
It was Shevardnadze, who succeeded Gamsakhurdia, in fact, who completed the process 
of joining the CIS in 1993 (then the Collective Security Treaty) and walked back NATO 
membership. But this concession did not entail an abdication of Euro-Atlanticism. In fact, his 
pragmatic position was conditioned by two factors. The first was the dire need to establish 
stability in Georgia, and even that was insufficient for Shevardnadze to be persuaded into 
ascension until nearly a year of civil war had passed. Second, Shevardnadze pushed firm Euro-
Atlantic measures within the CIS and exposed the conditionality of Georgia’s membership. He 
warned that the CIS would disintegrate if Russia did not adopt a Western course conducive to the 
"development of democracy" and insisted that the organization had to oppose "aggressive 
separatism" and uphold the "territorial integrity of the CIS states" in a clear jab at Russia’s 
involvement in Abkhazia.120 Though Shevardnadze’s Euro-Atlanticism was on full display, his 
pragmatism ensured that relations with Russia were cordial, and he secured a basing agreement 
in 1995 to consolidate Georgia’s precarious security. But even this was a step too far for many 
Georgian elites, who were furious over Russia’s treatment of the secessionist issue, and they 
made clear their dissatisfaction with this break in the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality when they 
refused to ratify the basing agreements.121 Once stabilization had been achieved, however, 
Shevardnadze returned to the Euro-Atlantic push, and he began to deepen Georgia’s institutional 
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engagement with the West. He had engaged preliminarily Georgia with Western institutions by 
his 1994 decision to enlist Tbilisi in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.122 He hinted that 
Georgia “might knock on NATO’s doors,” and then, in quick succession, formed the anti-
Russian GUAM and refused to renew the Collective Security Treaty. Behind these decisions was 
a consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic reality; a recognition that Russia, in the Georgian 
imagination, could offer little but headaches on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He elucidated this 
motivation when he made an open invitation in Washington for the “Euro-Atlantic Community, 
already rich in experience, to invigorate the joint effort to achieve a settlement in this conflict 
[Abkhazia].”123 Already Shevardnadze had managed to replace Russia with the United States as 
Tbilisi's principal military-financial benefactor.124 By the end of his administration, 
Shevardnadze’s Euro-Atlanticism was so perceptible that he declared the West and, in particular, 
the European Union, as the “ultimate harbor” for Georgia.125 He backed this up in policy at the 
2002 NATO summit when he made an official bid for full membership.  
Despite the fact that by the end of his administration, Shevardnadze had revived 
Georgia’s push for NATO membership and distanced from Russia, the actual process of 
integration had stalled under Shevardnadze’s hybrid-authoritarianism. The so-called ‘young 
reformer’ faction of Shevardnadze’s Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), one of the strongest in 
the legislature, felt that Shevardnadze’s Euro-Atlantic push was insufficient. They desired a 
firmer break with the Russian past, floating the idea that Georgia’s destiny—informed by the 
tsiperkhasnteslni—was to reject Eurasian influences and ‘return’ to the Western sphere.126 
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Indeed, the rapid change in political leadership that followed the 2003 Rose Revolution did not 
elevate an opposition with conciliatory views towards Russia.127 Instead, the ‘new reformers, led 
by Saakashvili (who had quit as Minister of Justice in 2001 over corruption accusations against 
Shevardnadze) and his opposition United National Movement (UNM) party, proved far more 
zealous in their Euro-Atlanticism. They would, in time, confirm Georgia’s conclusive “Russia 
decision” by their cavalier policy towards the secessionist states and NATO.  
Zurab Zhvania, Saakashvili’s first prime minister, famously echoed the new course when 
he declared “I am Georgian, and therefore I am European.”128 Saakashvili employed symbolic 
tactics to exemplify this identification, such as displaying a European flag at his inauguration, 
and then reiterating that Georgia’s direction was decidedly “towards European integration” and 
that this direction was providentially arranged for Georgia to “take its own place in European 
family, in European civilization, the place lost long ago.”129 Concurrently, Saakashvili fixed the 
issue of territorial integrity at the forefront of his Euro-Atlantic agenda, going so far as to assert 
that “Georgia’s territorial integrity is the goal of my life.”130 His millenarian, almost 
monomaniac, conviction in the Euro-Atlantic vision—Georgia as united, independent, and 
Western—left an enduring impact on his political program. He committed to recovering 
Abkhazia by 2008 and redoubled the push for NATO and EU membership. Frederick Coen notes 
that Saakashvili wildly proposed integrating almost all public functions into the Euro-Atlantic 
community, including the judicial system, the foreign ministry, immigration desks, national 
railways, and many other services.131 His pro-Western rhetoric earned Georgia a nomination for 
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NATO membership from John McCain and Hilary Clinton as well as a NATO liaison officer to 
expedite integration. Saakashvili enjoyed domestic extensive support for his program, and an 
unofficial referendum in January 2008 showed 77 percent of voters in favor of NATO 
membership.132 At the same time, given the renewed threat to their sovereignty, the secessionist 
states understandably defaulted back onto Russian protection.133 It was no surprise then that 
Saakashvili accused Russia during negotiations of annexing Georgian territory “behind these 
[Russian] peacekeeping troops.” The non-negotiability of Georgia’s claim to the secessionist 
states—the ‘red-line’ of Georgia’s constructed reality—all but guaranteed that Saakashvili would 
accelerate Georgia’s turn to the Western alliance structure and irritate a Kremlin averse to further 
NATO expansion on the Russia border. Indeed, Saakashvili had done little to promote 
reconciliation; he pushed forces into contested territories, escalated tensions with Putin, renamed 
the Minister for Conflict Resolution as Minister of Reunification, and lobbied hard for a clear 
path to NATO membership.134 Once Saakashvili procured a commitment for eventual 
membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Georgia’s Russia decision neared completion. The 
outbreak of war in 2008, largely a product of these initiatives from Georgia, simply confirmed 
the decision; in institutional terms it was validated when Saakashvili, following Tbilisi’s military 
defeat, defected from the CIS, or as Saakashvili appropriately called it: “some kind of post-
Soviet kind of thing.”135  
Euro-Atlanticism, as illustrated, was decisive in determining Georgia’s Russia decision. 
It was the vigorous ideology of the elite and was persistently employed in rationalizing 
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decisions. Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili had captured this logic when she declared before 
the initiative of NATO’s “Intensified Dialogue” that “Georgia is on a point of no return towards 
NATO; Euro-Atlantic aspirations are not part of the political game; this is a political belief of the 
Georgian people.”136 Each stage of integration with NATO and de-integration with Russia 
flowed in Saakashvili’s administration from this fundamental belief.  
Although Saakashvili’s administration was punctuated by extreme enmity and violence 
with Russia, the Euro-Atlantic outlook was irrevocably reinforced by the 2008 war. Domestic 
political changes after Saakashvili have failed to upend Euro-Atlanticism within the Georgian 
elite. When the opposition Georgian Dream (GD) defeated the UNM in 2012 elections, Bidzina 
Ivanishvili and his anti-Saakashvili allies assumed power on a presumed platform of conciliation 
with Russia.137 Nevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic direction has remained remarkably stable, and the 
Georgian Dream has never violated the ‘red-line’ on the secessionist territories. Maia Panjikidze, 
GD’s inaugural foreign minister, clarified that Georgia would never accede to Russia’s 
precondition for normalization of relations: recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Instead, she accused the Kremlin of “occupying 20% of Georgia’s territories; Russia is 
an occupying country; it has two embassies, one in Tskhinvali and another one in Sokhumi, and 
as long as it remains so, diplomatic relations with Russia will not be restored.”138  
De-linkage eventually allowed relations to normalize, but the fundamental controversy 
cannot be resolved as long as territorial unification is sacrosanct in the elite constructed reality. 
Mariam Naskidashvili and Levan Kakhishvili conducted interviews in 2017 with Georgian 
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political elites on both sides of the legislature to evaluate their “national identity” and its impact 
on foreign policy. The opposition, in general, expresses views in line with firm Euro-
Atlanticism; one MP noted that “Russia, in principle, denies Georgia’s right to be an independent 
and sovereign country.” Georgian Dream, though more conciliatory than the opposition on 
Russia, nevertheless agrees that acute threats emanate from Russia and that Georgia should 
continue towards full Euro-Atlantic integration.139 The confirmation of the Euro-Atlantic 
trajectory has been impressed clearly on Georgian Dream; Irakli Garibashvili, Ivanishvili’s 
successor and a key negotiator in the Georgia-EU Association Agreement (including the 
DCFTA), recycled Saakashvili’s and Bezhuashvili’s Euro-Atlantic determinism when he 
proclaimed: “[the signature of the agreement] is a new great date in the chronicles of the 
homeland...that is Europe, its political, economic, social, and cultural environment, from which 
our country was artificially alienated for centuries…Georgia does not view Europe only as a 
political choice. We have shared common values and worldviews with Europe for centuries, and 
this is exactly what we value most. This is exactly why Georgia has always considered itself part 
of European civilization.”140 Clearly, the ‘median’ constructed reality—Western-affiliated 
Georgia, protected by the Euro-Atlantic alliance structure from a neo-imperialist Russia that 
seeks to undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia—remains central to Georgia’s elite 
psychology. The window for reconciliation, especially after the 2008 war, has ceased to be a 
possibility within the elite political spectrum, thereby confirming Georgia’s “Russia decision.”   
 
Section 2B: Armenia and the Complementary-Eurasian Constructed Reality   
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Armenia: Complementary-Eurasianism  
Unlike their Georgian counterparts, Armenian elites have strained to maintain amicable 
relations with the West and Russia. This is in no small part a result of Armenia’s historical and 
geographic position. While Armenian elites communicate a desire to belong to the Euro-Atlantic 
community, and even consider themselves ‘European,’ the European preference has taken a 
secondary position in the development of Armenia’s constructed reality.141 This might not have 
been the case had Armenian elites avoided framing their national narrative and post-
independence identity around Nagorno-Karabakh. Just as reunification with the secessionist 
territories in Georgia forms a central component of both elite Georgian political identity and 
influences Tbilisi's attitude towards Russia, so too has Nagorno-Karabakh loomed large in 
Armenian national priorities and determined the intimacy of Armenian-Russian relations.  
For the Armenian populace, the controversy over Nagorno-Karabakh is a highly charged 
political and security dilemma. Armenians cite antiquity in their claims to ownership of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and regard its majority Armenian population as tenacious defenders of their 
homeland. The attachment to Nagorno-Karabakh was only enhanced following the Armenian 
Genocide and the loss of Western Armenia after World War I. After the Bolshevik invasion, the 
Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party, despite the preponderance of ethnic Armenians in the 
region, decided to make Nagorno-Karabakh a constituent part of the Azerbaijan SSR.142 Moscow 
also refused to compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status throughout the Soviet period. As a 
result, nationalist demonstrations for reunification with Armenia only materialized during 
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perestroika and sparked a massive popular mobilization for the cause, which was inflamed by an 
Azeri pogrom that killed over 30 and dispossessed thousands of Armenians.143 Following a 
declaration of sovereignty in August 1990, open warfare broke out in early 1991 and continued 
until a Russian-mediated OSCE ceasefire in 1994, by which time Armenian and local Karabakh 
forces had succeeded in occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding republics.144 As 
the Armenians had dropped their direct claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, the independent Republic of 
Artsakh was declared under practical Armenian protection, but without international recognition. 
Artsakh and Armenia, nevertheless, are highly integrated and even rotate political leaders. 
Furthermore, political elites in Yerevan have successfully transformed the narrative around 
protecting Nagorno-Karabakh into the defining component of post-independence Armenian 
identity.145 As a result, national leadership has been legitimated and de-legitimated based on the 
Karabakh issue, such as when Ter-Petrosyan was deposed for excessive conciliation over the 
issue and was replaced with Kocharyan, Artsakh’s former president.  
The intransigent elite commitment to Nagorno-Karabakh, however, has also induced a 
permanent security crisis with historic rivals in Turkey and Azerbaijan. The conflict has featured 
two wars against Baku (1992-4 and 2016) and a damaging joint economic blockade that remains 
in force today. Ankara has made it clear that normalization is conditioned on Armenia 
renouncing its “aggressive policy” against Baku.146 These quarrels have reinforced pre-existing 
Armenian views on Turkey and Azerbaijan—already prejudiced to hostility on account of the 
Armenian Genocide, the loss of western Armenia, and the Soviet-era Azeri appropriation of 
 
143 Ibid. 
144 Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus, 1988-1994,” in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno 
Coppieters (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 2011), 30-7.  
145 Ghaplanyan, Post-Soviet Armenia, 121-151.  
146 Mirzoyan, Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West, 31.  
  57 
Nagorno-Karabakh—and confirmed their position as the “other” and “natural enemy” in the 
post-Soviet Armenian imagination. For example, official narratives have reconstructed the 1992-
4 war to indict Baku as the aggressor. President Kocharyan in 2011 declared that the conflict had 
been “unleashed by Azerbaijani authorities seeking to conquer the territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh through ethnic cleansing.”147 He perfectly captured the “othering” of Azeris when he 
remarked that the pre-independence pr ograms had shown that “Armenians and Azerbaijanis are 
ethnically incompatible.”148 As for Turkey, despite repeated peace negotiations, Ankara has 
generally proved less flexible on diplomatic normalization than Yerevan. The perception of 
Turkish intransigence has reified anti-Turkish sentiment in the national security discourse. 
Kocharyan’s successor, Sargsyan, combined historical antipathy towards Turkey with vocal 
opposition towards their post-Soviet approach to regional politics. In a speech to the Greek 
Cypriot legislature, Sargsyan accused Ankara of pursuing a policy of “New Ottomanism,” and 
asked: “What did the Ottoman Empire bring to the peoples under its yoke other than massacres, 
oppression, and tyranny? Does anyone miss Ottomanism, providing a reason to deliver a “New 
Ottomanism?”149 Furthermore, even when political leaders have upheld an international 
negotiation process and encouraged reconciliation, Armenian elites have domestically defaulted 
to maximalist positions on Nagorno-Karabakh and ethno-national rhetoric vis-a-vis their ‘historic 
enemy.’  
The natural reaction of Armenian elites, perhaps the only available option given elite and 
popular commitment to the independence of Artsakh and Turkey’s membership in NATO, has 
been to identify with Armenia’s traditional protector, Russia. Yerevan’s preference for Russia, 
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just like the enmity towards Azeris and Turks, reflects experiences that predate independence as 
well as post-independence experiences that confirmed the preference. In the 19th century, major 
figures in the Armenian liberation movement prioritized reliance on Russia against the Ottoman 
Empire, which governed the western Armenian provinces. The contrast between the infidel 
‘other’ of Turkey and Christian Russia prejudiced Armenians to view their northern neighbor 
with goodwill and appreciation. For example, during World War I and the Armenian Genocide, 
Russia supported Armenians in their famous 1915 defense of Van against Ottoman troops and 
Russian troops received a rapturous reception when Armenian troops advanced into Western 
Armenia in 1916.150 Even during Soviet rule, when Moscow encouraged constituent nationalities 
to define and clarify their identities, Armenian diaspora and domestic elites continued to frame 
their identity in opposition to Turkey. This confirmed Russia’s enduring role as benevolent 
protector. Consequently, dissident and official nationalism retained an unusual loyalty to the 
Soviet Union in spite of the deprivation of Nagorno-Karabakh.151  
As discussed, when Armenian elites began to construct their vision onto the post-Soviet 
reality, they placed the recovery of Nagorno-Karabakh at the center of their identity. The sudden 
Armenian antipathy towards the Soviet Union expressed in the 1991 referendum was the result 
of Gorbachev’s decision to occupy Karabakh in March 1988. Charged with establishing law and 
order, Soviet troops showed a clear proclivity for the Azeri position, even assisting with 
deportations of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh when Armenian nationalists assumed office 
in August 1990.152 The anti-Soviet mood prevailed until the 1991 putsch with the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union and the emergence of a Russia that feared a NATO-aligned Turkey would project 
their power into the Caucasus.153 The deteriorating situation, especially the 1993 blockade, 
induced Yerevan to default back onto Russia’s security umbrella. Moscow’s consistent provision 
of military equipment, security guarantees, and official support to Armenia reinforced Russia’s 
position as the indispensable partner.  
The geo-political reality of Russian amity and Azeri-Turkish enmity that succeeded elite 
prioritization of Nagorno-Karabakh has been constant since independence. Armenia’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes the sustained “threat to national security” posed by the 
“aggressive policy of militant posturing” by the Republic of Azerbaijan and their “strategic 
partner” in Turkey.154 Armenian elites have therefore elevated a ‘Russia-first’ or ‘Eurasian’ 
affiliation above their cultural affinity for Euro-Atlantic integration. The NSS also evinces how 
Armenia’s engagement with Euro-Atlantic structures is subordinated to Russia. The document 
valorizes the Russian relations for its “importance for the security of Armenia, the traditional 
friendly links between the two nations, the level of trade and economic relations, Russia's role in 
the Nagorno Karabakh mediation effort, as well as the presence of a significant Armenian 
community in Russia, all contribute to a strategic partnership.” In contrast to Georgia—always 
vociferous in calling for Euro-Atlantic integration—Armenia has avoided committing to future 
assimilation in Western institutions, and instead encourages “close relations” with Euro-Atlantic 
structures like the EU. Armenian elites never constructed their post-independence national 
identity around an integrated Euro-Atlantic vision (i.e. the Western-affiliated and unified 
Georgia), prioritizing instead Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, all political parties in Armenia 
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concur that Yerevan has no ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’ identity to direct foreign policy, and instead 
default to a ‘complimentary’ policy of officially accommodating the major blocs.155  
Nevertheless, the privileged role afforded to Russia by Armenian elites has induced a 
clear proclivity for Eurasian affiliation, such as the 2013 decision to drop negotiations for an EU 
Association Agreement and instead opt for a place within the Eurasian Economic Union. Elites 
have generally consented to this affiliation, and even the main opposition party at the time 
acquiesced to Eurasian membership given the current geopolitical situation and security 
challenges.156 In effect, the acquiescence demonstrates how the Armenian constructed reality, 
especially its insistence on a favorable resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh, has forced a level of 
dependence on Russia. The ‘median’ shared constructed reality for the post-independence period 
can therefore be summarized as a Russian-affiliated Armenia, protected by Russia and its 
security structures from a Turkish-Azerbaijan axis desirous of Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
complimentary element is ancillary insofar as it has not affected Armenia’s “Russia decision,” 
even if it remains significant in how Armenian elites conduct their foreign policy outside 
Russian-relations.  
 
Complimentary-Eurasianism in the Political Leadership 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Armenia’s first president, has the special distinction of inculcating 
Complimentary-Eurasism into the emerging political elite while simultaneously rejecting its 
fundamental premises. As the accepted leader of the pro-reunification Karabakh Committee, Ter-
Petrosyan helped define the recovery of Nagorno-Karabakh as the centerpiece of Armenian 
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identity and mobilized the population behind liberation. He succeeded in transforming the 
Karabakh Committee into Armenia’s first ruling party, the Pan-Armenian National Movement 
(PANM), and supported Karabagh’s ‘national liberation’ war against Azerbaijan.157 By building 
a post-independence identity around Nagorno-Karabakh, Ter-Petrosyan placed Yerevan in a 
situation where elites would be forced eventually to seek assistance from its Russian patron to 
avoid encirclement and isolation. Nevertheless, Ter-Petrosyan’s personal opposition to identity-
constructed ‘maximalist’ policies encouraged him to attempt a break-out from the constructed 
reality. Aware of the development of identity-dependent constructed realities he rejected 
“national ideology” in favor of a pragmatic-realist approach. In this sense he rejected each 
element of the constructed reality.  
First, Ter-Petrosyan claimed that Armenia’s principal security guarantee was 
“normalization of relations with our neighbors” and accordingly expressed a sincere desire to 
“establish mutually beneficial bilateral relations with Turkey.” Second, he rejected the notion 
that Russia could serve as a definitive protector and warned that the Armenian people had lost 
faith in Russia as the “guarantor of our people’s survival.”158 Amicable relations with Russia 
might still be conditioned on security and economic realities, such as membership in the CIS, but 
according to Ter-Petrosyan they could no longer afford the “illusion that our national aspirations 
will be fulfilled sometimes by Western Europeans, and more typically by Russia...committing to 
this idea has cost us dearly.”159 Armenian engagement with post-Soviet and Russian institutions 
in the initial period should therefore not be viewed as a product of the Eurasian affiliation, but as 
the consequence of Ter-Petrosyan’s “pragmatic” approach.  
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Nevertheless, he understood Armenia’s acute military and economic insecurity, and 
therefore increased Armenia’s security dependence on Russia and the CIS. For example, Ter-
Petrosyan was quick to call on Russia and other signatories of the CIS Security Treaty (the 
predecessor to the 1994 Collective Security Treaty) to fulfill their treaty obligations and aid 
Armenia during the conflict with Azerbaijan.160 Russian military assistance, in excess of 1 billion 
USD, and critical fuel provisions had been instrumental in procuring Armenia’s military 
victory.161 It was therefore only natural for Ter-Petrosyan to recognize Russia’s vital place within 
the complementarity policy, and he justified membership in the CIS and the CST as a 
precondition for procuring further military-political support. In particular, Yerevan stood to gain 
a military edge from the dispersal of Soviet weaponry associated with membership in the CST.162 
Despite Ter-Petrosyan’s ever-complimentary rhetoric, Armenia inhabited a constructed reality, 
even if the president rejected its implications, and therefore he was compelled by Armenia’s geo-
political necessity to find security in Russia. These were the justifications for the deepening of 
bi-lateral relations, culminating in military-cooperation agreements in 1996 and the first effective 
security alliance in the 1997 “Armenian-Russian Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance.” Prior to signing the agreement, however, Ter-Petrosyan, noted that the 
treaty could not be viewed as an instrument for resolving the Karabakh conflict, which he 
insisted required a complimentary approach, possibly involving Armenian concessions.163  
 Although Ter-Petrosyan was not personally a subscriber to the identity-ideological 
narrative that valorized Russia as patron-in-chief, his policies encouraged elite and public 
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identification with Russia. One major organization, known as the Armenian’s People Initiative 
Russia-Belarus-Armenia, attracted over a million signatures (about half the population) and 
insisted that Ter-Petroysan set up a referendum for membership in the newly established Union 
State of Russia and Belarus. Indeed, Ter-Petrosyan was not entirely mistaken when he defended 
his (allegedly insufficient) outreach to Russia by claiming that more had been done for bilateral 
relations with Russia than in the last “300 years of Russo-Armenian ties.”164 Nevertheless, Ter-
Petrosyan’s commitment to the multi-vectored policy and his sincere belief in rapprochement to 
resolve Nagorno-Karabakh proved unsustainable.  
Finally, in 1997, Ter-Petrosyan made his definitive error when he crossed the red-line of 
Armenia’s Complimentary-Eurasianism: Nagorno-Karabakh. Driven to upend the status quo of 
blockade and isolation, Ter-Petrosyan had endorsed the controversial phased approach produced 
by the OSCE Minsk Group, which required concessions such as returning regions adjacent to 
Nagorno-Karabakh, then under Armenian occupation, back to Azerbaijan.165 He asserted that the 
current situation offered “only one option, a compromise solution” and that a “strategy of 
maximalism” in Nagorno-Karabakh would lead to the “ultimate destruction of Karabakh.” In 
reality, the ‘strategy of maximalism’ was an essential part of the post-independence identity and 
Ter-Petrosyan concessionary posture aroused massive opposition from the political opposition 
and PANM. Notes from 1998 ministerial discussions reveal how ruling-party elites had adopted 
the constructed reality despite Ter-Petrosyan. Major Armenian leaders in the meeting of the 
National Security Council, including Robert Kocharyan (the first president of Nagorno-
Karabakh, then Prime Minister and future president), Vazgen Sargsyan (a popular paramilitary 
leader then serving as Defense Minister, and briefly Prime Minister under Kocharyan), Serzh 
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Sargsyan (then Interior Minister and later Prime Minister and President), and Arkadi Ghukasyan 
(then the president of Nagorno-Karabakh), refused to give ground over Nagorno-Karabakh. They 
downplayed the effect of Nagorno-Karabakh on Armenia’s economic isolation (“the blockades 
do not affect Armenia’s economic development...it is not an obstacle to foreign investment...the 
example of Israel shows it is possible to develop even under conditions of isolation”), insisted 
that political isolation was impossible (“Russia and Iran will help us,”), and warned that 
“Azerbaijan might renege on the agreement with any pretext.”166 Every core element of the 
constructed reality was here on display among Armenian elites; intransigence on Nagorno-
Karabakh, Russia as a patron-protector, and the danger inherent in the Azeri-Turkic ‘other.’ Ter-
Petrosyan’s rejection of the constructed reality proved his downfall, and only a month after the 
argument he was deposed by his ministers.  
 Robert Kocharyan, who replaced Ter-Petrosyan with the backing of factions inclined 
towards a firmer Eurasian strategy, brought the so-called Russophile ‘Karabakh clan’ into office. 
They would remain in power until the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Under Kocharyan and his 
successor, Serzh Sargsyan, the discourse around Nagorno-Karabakh hardened and negotiations 
with Azerbaijan and Turkey over the contested territory stalled.167 Kocharyan invigorated the 
push for recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide as ethno-nationalist politics assumed a 
larger role in the public discourse and reformulated the dynamic of relations around Armenian-
Turkic relations.168 Kocharyan did, however, embrace the complimentary course in the search for 
economic development and optionality. Alongside Foreign Minister Oskanian, Kocharyan 
branched out to Euro-Atlantic structures, such as the Council of Europe, and trumpeted 
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Armenia’s European identity. The EU encouraged this outreach by including Armenia in the 
EU’s 2004 European Neighborhood Policy initiative, which was welcomed by Kocharyan and 
his advisers.169 But Armenia’s constructed reality, unlike Georgia's, was never premised on an 
exclusive cultural affiliation to Europe. Outreach to Western institutions therefore were strictly 
delimited. Kocharyan expressed no interest in joining NATO, for example, and limited 
Yerevan’s engagement in its 2005 IPAP to democratic and defense reforms.170 This contrasts 
starkly with Saakashvili’s IPAP which opened with a declaration that Georgia’s “strategic 
objectives” are “membership of NATO and integration with the European Union.”171 Instead, 
Nagorno-Karabakh remained central to the Armenian identity and as a result, Kocharyan’s 
national strategy was defined by its ‘Russia-first’ mentality and Eurasian tilt.172 This strategy 
included a deliberate push to increase Russia’s presence in the economic sphere to match its pre-
existing military commitments, especially after 2003, when Kocharyan’s ministry invited 
(discussed in section 3) Russian investment through debt-for-asset swaps. Accompanying 
Kocharyan’s policy was a discursive commitment to Russia, presented in media, press releases, 
and interviews, that emphasized Russia’s position as the “caring” patron.173 Kocharyan’s 
administration, in effect, embedded the post-independence constructed reality into policy and 
rhetoric by its devotion to Russia and hardened ‘othering’ of Turkey and Armenia. By the end of 
Kocharyan’s administration—mostly as a product of inviting a larger Russian role in the Russian 
economy—Armenia had added complete economic dependence to its extant security dependence 
on Russia. 
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Sargsyan was elected to the presidency amid a political storm over electoral fairness and 
growing concern for Armenia’s deepening dependence on Russia. To manage these difficulties, 
he secured normalizing protocols with Turkey (rejected by the Turkish parliament) and persisted 
with Yerevan’s restrained Euro-Atlantic engagement with the European Union and NATO’s 
Partnership to Peace. In reality Sargsyan, along with his pro-Russian foreign minister, Eduard 
Nalbandyan, were reverting to the superficial approach to the complimentary policy, complete 
with an obvious bias for Russian security paternalism. In 2010, for example, they extended for a 
half-century the lease on a Russian military base in Armenia that Ter-Petrosyan had conceded in 
1995, and explicitly tied it to Russia’s protective role in Nagorno-Karabakh.174 Sargsyan 
combined his appreciation for contemporary Russian assistance—including enormous Russian 
investments and extant security commitments—with an historical appreciation for Russia’s role 
as Armenia’s permanent “friend and partner.”175 Nalbandyan went so far as to admit Russia’s 
role as Yerevan’s “savior.”176 In 2013, Sargsyan confirmed the prejudice in the complementarity 
policy when Yerevan withdrew from negotiations for a EU Association Agreement and joined 
the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union (later the EAEU). Sargsyan’s decision represented the 
decisive moment of official affiliation. In contrast with the CIS, the EAEU is a supranational 
entity with an institutional commitment reminiscent of the European Union. Armenia’s 
commitment to the Eurasian bloc thereby represents a “Russia decision” that precludes complete 
integration in a competing bloc.  
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The 2018 Velvet Revolution ended the controversial rule of the Karabakh clan and 
invited speculation that Armenian-Russian relations could deteriorate. Nevertheless, as in the 
case of Georgian Dream, the change in political leadership has failed to reverse Armenia’s 
“Russia decision.” Armenia’s new prime minister and the leader of the revolution, Nikol 
Pashinyan, who previously led the anti-EAEU Way Out faction, has assumed the 
Complimentary-Eurasian constructed reality despite his previous skepticism. The concept of 
Eurasian integration, in particular, has emerged in Pashinyan’s discourse as a recurring theme 
and desired outcome.177 In fact, Pashinyan has become a vocal supporter of the EAEU, such as 
calling for the expansion of EAEU free-trade agreements with Asian countries. With regards to 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Pashinyan assumed a posture decidedly more maximalist than Kocharyan or 
Sargsyan when he declared for unification between Armenia and Karabakh and proclaimed 
“Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it.”178 Unsurprisingly, Pashinyan’s posture vis-a-vis Nagorno-
Karabakh has come with a rhetorical push to “raise the level of relations” with Russia.179 To 
shore up his post-revolution relations with Moscow, Pashinyan even committed troops to Syria 
upon Moscow’s request, earning a favorable response from Russian Defense Minister Sergey 
Shoigu, who congratulated his ministerial counterpart for being the “the first to respond to our 
call for providing assistance to the Syrian people.”180 As in Georgia, therefore, the consolidation 
and durability of the elite constructed reality has limited the availability of alternative trajectories 
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for Armenia. Although political turnover has elevated the opposition into office, Yerevan’s 
affiliation with Russia and Eurasian trajectory remained durable and unaltered.  
 
Diagram 2: Constructed Realities and ‘Institutional Engagement’ 
 
Constructed 
Reality 
Key Elements of Fixed ‘Median’ 
Constructed Reality 
Outcomes of Elite 
Constructed Realities 
(examples)  
Armenia: 
Complementary-
Eurasianism  
Commitment to Nagorno-Karabagh; 
historical patronage and immediate 
protection by Russia and Eurasian sphere 
against Turkish and Azeri ‘other’;  
secondary ‘complementary’ European 
identity.  
Security alliance with Russia; 
engagement in CIS and 
CSTO; limited association 
with NATO and EU; 
integration into EAEU. 
Georgia: Euro-
Atlanticism  
‘European’ identity and political destiny;  
 national souverainism (territorial unity);  
 anti-Russian sentiment.    
Membership in GUAM, 
defection from CIS and CST, 
integrative steps towards 
NATO and EU.   
 
Section 3: Economic Dependence 
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
Definition 
According to the political economist, Albert O. Hirschman, a minor power is 
economically dependent upon a larger power when it is difficult or costly for the smaller state to 
replace the major power’s market share or economic impact, and therefore the major power 
acquires influence over the minor power.  
 
Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy 
Existing literature on economic dependence tends to concentrate on whether larger 
powers can reliably deploy their leverage to achieve political goals over small powers. Realists 
tend to express skepticism towards the efficacy of economic statecraft, prioritizing hard military 
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power over softer linkages. Neo-liberals, by contrast, may place excessive stress on the 
relationship between small state acquiescence and economic sanctions/incentives from the larger 
partner. Many studies, nevertheless, have demonstrated links between the degree of economic 
dependence and foreign policy. Some have adopted similar analytical approaches to this 
research, such as framing foreign policy in terms of elite priorities and economic dependence. 
For example, Wen Zha found that the comparatively higher level of economic dependence of 
Thailand on China, in contrast with the Philippines, had a pro-Chinese intervening effect on 
Thailand’s elite-run foreign-policy.181 Furthermore, quantitative reviews generally report an 
affirmative relationship between trade vulnerability and foreign policy acquiescence.182  
 
Economic Dependence and Elites in the Near Abroad 
The post-Soviet states present a special challenge for researchers. Constituent republics 
lost many pre-Soviet networks and became interwoven into the USSR’s central economic 
structure. While that structure disintegrated intra-republican linkages nevertheless endured after 
independence. This dynamic has allowed scholars to interrogate economic dependence in the 
near abroad, specifically on Russia, as a function of small state foreign policy activity. As a 
result, dependence studies in the post-Soviet space tend to amalgamate the implications of 
economic reliance with elite preferences. Certain behaviors correspond with economic reliance; 
post-Soviet states dependent on Russia endanger the political control of ruling elites if they 
pursue a foreign policy path that invites economic shock by ‘breaking-out’ from Russian 
economic interests.183 As in Ukraine, where newly empowered elites with their own anti-Russian 
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constructed reality defected from Moscow in 2013, elites can nevertheless reorient their 
asymmetrically dependent economies away from Russia and towards the West, although at high 
costs to national economic and security interests.184 Alternatively, if elites view the cost of 
defection from Moscow as unpalatable, or value extant economic and security relations with 
Russia, then further integration in Russia’s post-Soviet framework is a plausible outcome. The 
extent and direction of economic dependence therefore includes conditions that pre-dated 
independence as well as succeeded it.  
 
Hypothesis 
The extent of economic dependence in Georgia and Armenia is concurrently a product of 
pre-existing and developing economic conditions as well as deliberate policy choices by political 
elites. This section illustrates the trajectory of economic dependence with Russia or the West 
over time, and then provides snapshots of how elites in Armenia and Georgia responded to these 
changes by expanding or curbing engagement with Russia in their foreign policies. In blockaded 
Armenia, the drift towards ‘Russian affiliation’ was in large part due to the value of post-Soviet 
linkages, and the conscious response of political elites in Yerevan, who struggled to attract 
Western investment, was to maintain and later deepen extant dependence on Russia to attain 
valuable developmental and fiscal priorities. In Georgia, after an initial period of high 
dependence and similar (though begrudging) maintenance of post-Soviet linkages, Tbilisi 
attracted higher investment and economic intercourse from the West, which further encouraged 
elites, already prejudiced towards the West, to associate with Euro-Atlantic economic structures. 
In effect, the extent and direction of ‘Russia relations’ corresponds with the degree of economic 
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dependence between the subject state and the post-Soviet space, and this is reflected in the 
economic foreign policy of Armenian and Georgian elites.  
 
Section 3A: Armenia and Economic Dependence on Russia 
 
 
Economic Context in Period 1: Collapsing and Maintained Post-Soviet Links  
The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the coordinated economic structure of the 
integrated whole, leaving newly independent states with economic fragments devoid of the 
USSR’s deliberate interconnectivity. For the South Caucasus, the markers of this process were 
conveyed by closures of Soviet routes across new national boundaries, extreme disruptions to 
trade and industry, and energy crises. Armenia faced four interrelated economic calamities in the 
immediate aftermath of independence: industrial depression, hyper-inflation, trade blockades, 
and energy shortages. These challenges compounded already difficult efforts to rebuild after the 
mass-fatality 1988 Spitak earthquake, which killed between 25,000 and 50,000 Armenians and 
shut down the massive Medzamor nuclear power.185  
Industrial depression followed the loss of inputs from the breakdown in reliable trade and 
trade routes in the near abroad. Armenia declined in 1992 by 37.5 percent of GDP as industrial 
sectors cratered. Light industry essentially ceased to exist. Industry’s percentage of GDP dropped 
fifteen points as agriculture came to account for nearly half of production. Before independence, 
it had constituted less than 15 percent of GDP.186 At the same time, price liberalization, 
introduced to fight shortages, brought prices to precarious levels relative to average income. 
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Compared with the first months of 1991, inflation rose nearly 650 percent in early 1992, before 
escalating into a dramatic hyper-inflationary spiral the next year.187 
In 1993, Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed a blockade on Armenia for its support of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The blockade effectively destroyed Armenia’s traditional trade routes. As a 
landlocked country, Armenia’s only remaining cross-border routes passed through Iran and 
Georgia, and neither country, for geo-political reasons around the US-Iran conflict and the 
Russo-Georgian conflict, could provide a reliable route for commerce’s desired destinations in 
the immediate post-independence period.188 The blockade, still in force today, is inextricably 
linked with the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and each party to the secessionist 
controversy is aware of this reality. Such durability captures the geo-political outlook of 
Armenian and Azeri elites—as well as, according to this thesis, Georgian elites vis-a-vis 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia—who prize in their constructed realities a territorial nationalism 
potent enough to dig in over the crisis and therefore prolong the blockade. It is a permanent 
feature of Armenia's post-Soviet economic history and a significant reason for Armenia’s lack of 
alternative economic partnerships. For example, once the blockade was practically in force in 
1992, Armenia suffered from a severe long-term energy crisis.189 For the next four years, 
Armenian energy customers averaged approximately two-hours of electricity usage per day. 
Without the Medzamor plant or access to reliable overland Soviet-era pipelines, Armenia had to 
scrape off its insufficient domestic hydropower with catastrophic consequences for industry and 
living standards.  
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As Soviet links across the South Caucasus were suddenly interrupted, if not outright 
destroyed, by political volatility, economic linkages with the near abroad cratered. Yerevan’s 
trade dependence on the former Soviet Union precipitously dropped; post-Soviet countries went 
from importing 98 percent of Armenia’s exports in 1988 to 18.8 percent in 2002 while the share 
of imports from the FSU (former Soviet Union) dropped from a near-monopoly to 22 percent.190  
Diplomatic stabilization with the 1994 ceasefire preceded a broader recovery that allowed 
Armenia to draw in markets beyond the post-Soviet space. The search for compensatory markets 
coincided with Russian instability that wounded Armenia’s export-import trade. Russia’s 
financial crisis in 1998, in particular, wreaked havoc on exports to CIS markets, which plunged 
as much as 30 percent.191 As a result of that persistent, but retrospectively temporary, 
macroeconomic instability, as well as Armenian trade and fiscal liberalization over the same 
period, the European Union and the United States captured substantial market shares. They were 
also providing significant amounts of humanitarian financial aid at a time when Russia was 
effectively incapacitated by internal strife.192 This was the economic situation that flourished 
under the original complementarity policy, and it is not difficult to see how Armenia’s 
flourishing ‘first-contact’ with the West aroused developmental interest among the elite.  
 Much has been exaggerated of this period, however, and several qualifications are 
required to qualify the decline in dependence. First, much of the value in Armenian exports to 
the West, particularly the European Union in this period, were processed diamonds. Armenia’s 
diamond industry, though prestigious and fast-growing, employed no more than 4,000 workers, 
generally skilled labor. Non-precious metal exports to the EU, by contrast, were cheap labor-
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intensive goods, such as alcohol products.193 Since the diamonds are imported, and only the 
processing occurs in Armenia, it is important to review a value-added analysis of Armenian 
exports. When the analysis shifts from total value of exports to the value added (gross exports of 
a product excluding gross imports of the same product), the EU’s market share of Armenian 
exports in 2000 falls from over 35 percent to 13 percent.194 European importers of lower value 
goods, such as apparel, could not generally justify the higher transport costs associated with the 
Armenian blockade. Only high value goods, like precious stones, were valued enough to warrant 
expensive air transport over the blockade.195  
Second, Armenia’s economic structure was pre-determined by Soviet command 
structures, and that configuration had a direct effect on Armenia’s trade direction. Exports to the 
near abroad reflected the capital-intensive and resource priorities of the Soviet economic 
structure. Armenian exporters enjoyed an empirical advantage in these markets relative to post-
Soviet competitors given Soviet experience and sustained contact.196 Armenia’s larger import 
market likewise drew its strength from CIS members. Not only did these states, and particularly 
Russia, collectively top the list of exporters to Armenia, but they also dominated the all-strategic 
energy supply that Yerevan depended upon to ward off a repeat of the 1992-6 energy crisis that 
had devastated the economy.  
Third, trade alone formed an insufficient metric to gauge levels of dependence. The non-
diamond value of Armenian exports formed less than 10 percent of national GDP.197 Armenia 
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also suffered from a potent export concentration, again relative to other CIS countries, that made 
valuable sectors susceptible to price swings on small selection of products. Contrary to the 
export-orientation of many developing countries, Armenia’s economic growth was 
disproportionately earned from services (in particular, telecommunications) and construction.198 
These three points illustrate the partial superficiality of the West’s overstated stake in 
Armenia. Armenian elites were not ruling over a high-growth export-focused economy that 
could supply quality goods to the West, but a re-calibrating one, increasingly leaning on services 
and construction. Furthermore, Russia remained a principal instrument for Armenia’s 
macroeconomic stability, especially when one adjusts for the negligible domestic return offered 
by the precious valuable trade with the EU and the historical familiarity of Armenia’s traditional 
heavy industries with the geography of the post-Soviet market. CIS markets were evolving into 
dynamic markets that offered a comparative advantage to Armenian exporters.199 Direct financial 
assistance was also supplied by the Russian Central Bank, which provided the credit necessary 
for Yerevan to implement budget consolidation.  
 
 Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 1: Post-Soviet Links as Stability  
With regards to Armenia’s formal economic ‘affiliation,’ national elites continued to 
prioritize Russian and post-Soviet linkages. In fact, the declining dependence of Armenia on 
Russia should not obscure its considerable size nor its increasing importance, and Armenian 
elites understood this reality. The Armenian government faced a general crisis, arising out of the 
post-Soviet security situation, that presented the possibility of complete economic isolation due 
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to the blockade, a lack of strategic alternatives in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the weakness of post-
Soviet Russia. Therefore, in this moment of extreme insecurity and economic confusion, 
Armenian elites prioritized salvaging post-Soviet networks. Even in the later 1990s, when trade 
with the West picked up and Russia tumbled into financial crisis, Yerevan focused on integrating 
into the economic support structure of the post-Soviet world. Though economic dependence on 
Russia in absolute terms declined, Armenian elites highly valued the surviving ties with Russia 
and eagerly worked to maintain the post-Soviet linkages. This would, in turn, increase Armenia’s 
economic dependence on Russia over the next period and perpetuate the cycle.  
Yerevan’s economic prioritization on Russia can first be evinced by the repeated attempts 
of political elites to preserve strategic post-Soviet agreements regarding currency. Despite 
extreme political volatility, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, and Turkmenistan all introduced new currencies or announced their 
intention to form them. Facing extreme inflationary pressures in excess of 100 percent per month 
in late 1993 and a collapse in GDP that eventually reached 61.2 percent of the pre-independence 
quantity, Armenian elites came to view the vestigial currency links as a source of desirable 
stability. It was clear that Armenia would suffer from the disintegration of the ruble zone and 
endure a catastrophic reversal in inter-republican terms of trade (TOT) in excess of 30 percent.200  
Ter-Petrosyan and his prime minister, Hrant Bagratyan, reacted to the crisis by stressing 
Armenia’s commitment to the ruble zone.201 They were not tempted to defect by the enthusiasm 
shown by new currencies. In fact, Armenian elites were quite determined to keep this powerful 
post-Soviet monetary system intact. Only Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia stood to gain from 
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the implicit GDP transfers that would follow the end of the ruble zone, and the financial fallout 
would be dire for the fragile Armenian economy.202 Ter-Petrosyan and Bagratyan worked to 
create the so-called ‘new style ruble zone’ (NSRZ) with an explicit drive towards “economic 
convergence” with Russia and committed partners, but the agreement collapsed when Russia 
insisted that the republics introduce their own currencies first and then demonstrate their 
commitment to monetary convergence. Ter-Petrosyan noted that “it was Russia itself that stood 
outside the ruble zone” as the NSRZ disintegrated and an independent Armenian currency was 
established. Despite the failure of the NSRZ, Armenian elites had demonstrated their 
commitment to post-Soviet structures, perhaps even more so than the Kremlin. In the same 
speech, Ter-Petrosyan noted his determination to find “productive and mutually advantageous 
development of cooperation with Russia and the former Soviet republics.”203  
Indeed, the Armenian government remained sympathetic towards post-Soviet structures, 
as it pushed for regional integration while other states, such as Georgia, pursued evasive tactics 
and formed regional blocs to oppose further integration. Tbilisi needed post-Soviet links to ward 
off the dire economic situation, but it had little intention of strengthening a Russia-backed 
superstructure. Armenian elites, by contrast, were explicit in their desire to transform the CIS 
into an effective post-Soviet economic network. In 1998, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian laid 
out six focal points for Armenian foreign policy, one of which was express support for economic 
integration and “free economic zones” within the CIS framework. He was clear that regional 
cooperation would invite specific economic gains among the member states.204 The Armenian 
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government matched its rhetoric with policy. Between 1993 and 2001, Armenia signed seven 
free trade agreements (FTAs) that would remain Armenia's only FTAs until the 2008 financial 
crisis. Each FTA was signed with a member of the CIS: Russia (1993), Moldova (1995), 
Kyrgyzstan (1995), Ukraine (1996), Turkmenistan (1996), Georgia (1998), and Kazakhstan 
(2001).205 Armenia and other sympathetic CIS states also attempted to unify regional bi-lateral 
free trading agreements into a formal free trade zone, but the Russian government failed to ratify 
the agreement. Nevertheless, by April 1997, the simultaneous process of internal reform and 
trade liberalization in Russia and Armenia had reached a point where the Minister of Economics 
could confidently inform the WTO that trade with Russia was effectively free.206 Certain 
contemporary observers argued that Armenia faced an economic challenge in “breaking-out” to 
the West, and that Armenia’s involvement in post-Soviet institutions captured their security 
reliance on Russia.207 The foreign policy of the Armenian ministry, as illustrated above, 
undermines that claim. Yerevan encouraged, albeit not always successfully, the establishment 
and maintenance of post-Soviet economic ties, generally as stabilizing measure against economic 
challenges, such as the currency threat or the necessity of maintaining pro-Soviet trade.  
 
Economic Context in Period 2: Growing Reliance on Russia  
Before the 2008 financial crisis, Armenia experienced a strong spurt of development that 
brought double-digit GDP growth. It was fueled, in part, by a dramatic wave of foreign 
investment. Unlike the export-focus economies of similar post-Soviet countries, the Armenian 
economy had struggled to develop a burgeoning export-import trade. Despite Yerevan’s hyper-
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liberal trade regime, Armenian merchandise exports as a percentage of GDP remained the lowest 
among FSU states.208 Macroeconomic stability, absent in the previous period, nevertheless 
created the conditions necessary for concentrated investment. In 2003, the Armenian government 
began to encourage foreign investment, in particular from the recently enlarged diaspora 
population, into real estate. Such an approach contradicted the standard development strategy of 
directing inflowing investment into exports to create sustainable FDI.209 As a result, Armenia 
developed a construction-centered growth model dependent on foreign capital inflows.  
In the previous period, Armenian elites had sought to defend the surviving post-Soviet 
links as potential sources of stability. By the 2000s, the relative tranquility in the near abroad 
allowed Armenia and Russia to not just maintain post-Soviet linkages but grow them. The 
renewed dependence of Armenia on Russia in this period originated from four principal causes: 
an upsurge in foreign direct investment (FDI), the rising value of remittances, energy-fiscal 
reforms, and growing CIS/Russia-directed trade. Each of these developments were instrumental 
in creating the growth rates that helped subdue rampant poverty from 54 percent in 2004 to 27 
percent in 2008.  
In 2003, FDI inflows contributed barely more than 100 million USD.210 FDI continued to 
rise until 2009, when inflows peaked at 950 million USD with FDI comprising 8.3 percent of 
GDP.211 Between 2000 and 2010, 72.5 percent of total FDI went towards transport, 
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water, finance, and mining. During this period of FDI-
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dependent growth, Russia acquired its dominant position over Armenia’s FDI inflows. In 2006, 
annual Russian investment comprised 35 percent of Armenia’s total FDI. Russia-directed 
investments were concentrated in the strategic transport, telecommunications, and energy 
industries, the latter of which was in the process of restructuring. In fact, Russia’s seventh-largest 
greenfield project in the late 2000s was an expansion of Razdan power station.212 FDI inflows 
from Russia were boosted by the activities of diasporan investors, who provided 40 percent of 
non-infrastructure FDI. In fact, Armenia’s construction-oriented boom was mostly fueled by 
large diasporan investments. The largest concentration of diasporan investors, unsurprisingly, 
hailed from Armenia’s enormous expatriate community in Russia.213  
Instability in the post-Soviet space helped grow the Armenian diaspora, and by 2011 
there were more than 6 million Armenian expatriates outside the Republic of Armenia, and 
perhaps as many as 2.5 million in Russia. An upsurge in economic activity in Russia, as well as 
deliberate choices by Yerevan vis-a-vis the diaspora, induced a remarkable rise in the value of 
remittances. By 2008, the International Labour Organization estimated that remittances 
constituted 18 percent of GDP with an annual value of 1.5 billion USD, and that more than 70 
percent of households received them.214 Prior to this upsurge, remittances were as low as 
650,000 USD in 1995, according to estimates based on World Bank figures.215 Remittances are 
widely agreed to be crucial for the Armenian economy. One survey found that remittances 
comprised on average 80 percent of household income for those families receiving them, and 
though this slants towards remittance-dependent households, the value is likely not much 
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lower.216 From a macroeconomic perspective, remittances also provide an aggregate net gain of 
0.77 percent of GDP to Armenia’s economy.217 Unsurprisingly, these inflows mostly originate in 
Russia, where the largest proportion of the diasporan community is concentrated. During the 
largest migratory outflows, the Russian government ensured to secure the proper treatment and 
rights of Armenian migrants. For example, in 2001, Putin remarked that Armenians “must be 
most kindly treated and encouraged in every way to come to Russia.”218 Russia’s share of 
remittances between 2005 and 2007 amounted to approximately 80 percent of the total value. 
This value does not include ‘informal’ remittances from Russia, such as consumer goods like 
electronics, which 7.4 percent of households also received at the time.219 Furthermore, given 
Armenia’s reliance on the agricultural sector, the disproportionate concentration of Russian 
remittances in rural households added another element of central dependence.220 Any disruption 
in Russo-Armenian economic ties or domestic economic turmoil in Russian sectors where 
Armenian migratory workers were employed (predominantly construction) threatened the 
regularity and scale of this crucially important transfer to a substantial number of the population.  
The chaotic first decade of independence had placed enormous strain on Armenian 
finances. The public debt problems were widely recognized by internal elites and external forces 
as a serious threat to the fiscal health of the republic. In 2001, the IMF noted that the Armenian 
government had “rapidly accumulated external liabilities...and are now facing an increasingly 
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difficult external debt burden, relative to their ability to generate primary external and budget 
surpluses.”221 Excluding institutional creditors, Russia had become Armenia’s largest bi-lateral 
creditor. Alongside Turkmenistan, Moscow owned 18 percent of external debt in net present 
value terms with an outstanding Armenian liability of 109 million USD in 1999.222 Armenia 
struggled to service its debt to Russia, which had grown to include costs for energy supplies and 
other deliveries.223 Problems with servicing the debt caused tension in Russo-Armenian relations 
and threatened to hamper smooth economic relations. In 2001, Yerevan was forced to divert 20 
million USD to a partial repayment when the Kremlin refused to again prolong repayment.224 
Another 17 million USD of servicing remained in arrears to Russia and Turkmenistan by 
2002.225 Yerevan had responded to the fiscal danger by embarking on an aggressive privatization 
and reorganization of its energy sector. Armenia’s geographic location and limited economic 
appeal, however, ensured that Western investors stayed away and presented no acquisition bids. 
For example, the fifth block of the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant, long unfinished, attracted no 
interest from Western investors.226  
Instead, Armenia conducted several debt-for-equity swaps with Russia that allowed 
Yerevan to offload its debt and increase investment at the expense of further energy and 
economic dependence. Financial management of the Seven Hrazdan hydropower cascade and six 
hydroelectric power plants were transferred to RAO UES, Russia’s electric company, in 
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exchange for complete debt forgiveness. The Medzamor nuclear power plant was placed under a 
five-year lease to RAO UES as well for writing-off gas delivery debts; the plant could have only 
been kept under Armenian management by continued subsidies from the government.227 The 
policy continued in 2006 when Armenia permitted Gazprom to acquire the fifth bloc in exchange 
for keeping gas prices stable during a period when rising prices throughout the CIS would have 
forced a doubling in charges.228 These transactions provided a launchpad for further investment 
by Russia in Armenia. Gazprom, for example, pledged to invest 150 million USD to complete 
the fifth block.229 But they also confirmed an almost permanent energy dependence on Russia.  
 Heavy foreign investment introduced new opportunities for trade. While Armenia was 
unable to transform into an export-oriented economy, and its trade deficit and excess 
concentration remained large, Armenian exports and imports grew 5 and 3.5 times, respectively. 
The increasing trade flow was generally directed towards CIS countries, which constituted in 
2007 approximately 70 percent of total Armenian trade turnover.230 Armenia’s strong legal 
framework with Russia and the CIS countries—developed from maintaining free trade 
agreements—provided a platform to grow trade with Russia as investment from that direction 
poured into Armenia.231  
 
 Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 2: Exploiting Dependence  
 Armenian elites in this period prioritized encouraging capital inflows and resolving their 
fiscal situation, but they were not initially biased toward any bloc in pursuit of these objectives. 
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The ‘complementary’ aspect of foreign policy was especially apparent in the developmental 
strategies of Armenia. Yerevan, however, struggled to attract Western investment into their 
energy privatization program and wider economic sectors. As a result, Armenian elites pivoted 
and agreed that engagement with Russia offered the best opportunities for fulfilling economic 
objectives. Rouben Shugarian, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, elucidated this viewpoint 
when he twice recognized that Russia was the “most probable potential investor into Armenia 
economy” in late 2003 while still rhetorically embracing the ‘complementary policy.’232 As 
predicted by Shugarian, Armenia’s economic environment was ripe for a Russian impression, 
which was encouraged by the Kocharyan government and their policy of debt-for-equity swaps 
and asset sales that increased Russian stakeholdership at the expense of further dependence on 
Russia and post-Soviet links.  
Many analysts have posed that the swaps and sales were foisted by Putin onto Kocharyan 
as a form of ‘energy imperialism.’ To a certain extent it is impossible to definitively resolve this 
question but framing the circumstances of the agreements helps to condition this allegation. First, 
it must be understood that Yerevan was serious about overcoming structural problems and 
improving its fiscal situation, but they persistently struggled to attract capital, particularly for 
vital energy reforms. The Central Bank of Armenia, for example, had targeted a far lower debt 
servicing value in 2002 of 90.5 million USD.233 Fiscal difficulties were also precluding 
investment from Russia. Furthermore, representatives from the IMF and the World Bank were 
encouraging asset handovers as a measure to reduce external indebtedness.234 Russia’s 
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experience with the Armenian energy industry was an additional impetus to deepen engagement 
with Moscow in this regard. For Kocharyan’s government, inviting Russian capital offered a 
double positive at the expense of independence: a platform to encourage Russian investment, 
particularly in an industry where Russians enjoyed traditional expertise, and substantial debt 
forgiveness. Putin himself backed up this position when he remarked: “it is not about the debts, it 
is about attracting Russian capital into the Armenian economy.”235 Kocharyan frequently 
reiterated that the proposal had come “from our side...nobody is trying to foist anything on us.” 
Indeed, he had first proposed a variant of the measure back in August 2001.236 Further evidence 
for the mutual nature of the agreements can be intuited from the harder negotiating line taken by 
Armenian elites. They rebuffed attempts by Moscow to score control of more valuable Armenian 
industries. Gagik Khachatryan, then the Minister of Finance, remarked “each party has its own 
interests...we want to clear as much debt as possible with as little property as possible...while 
they want to achieve the opposite.”237 Repeated delays in the settlement illustrates that this was 
not a simple submission by Yerevan; their own interests were served by attracting Russian 
investment, but on appropriate terms.  
Throughout the 2000s, the Armenian government consciously deepened their economic 
relationship with Russia, primarily by encouraging investment. In one instance when Russian 
investment had briefly dropped, Kocharyan smirkingly informed Putin that “Russia holds a 
disgraceful second place in terms of foreign investments in the Armenian economy...I have a 
sense that Russia will definitely hold the honorable first place by March.”238 In March 2006, 
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Kocharyan’s Chief Economic Advisor, Vahram Nercissiantz, reiterated the interconnection 
between Armenia's "reforms" and attracting further investment.239 Yerevan finalized several 
transactions with Russian companies, including the sale of the main electricity system to 
Russia’s Unified Energy System (UES) company for $73 million. Galust Sahakian, the leader of 
the ruling parliamentary faction, justified it with a mix of economic pragmatism (“naturally, the 
state is interested in making the possible deal the most profitable for Armenia”) and 
Complimentary-Eurasianism (“...but we would not like the electricity network to be sold to, for 
example, a Turkish company”). 240 As for the 2006 Hrazdan sale to Gazprom, Kocharyan 
defended it by reminding critics that no other investor had shown interest in refurbishing the fifth 
bloc. He asked: “is it better to have an enterprise which is half-build, exposed to the 
elements...has already wasted one credit project...or to have a Russian enterprise on our 
territory...an enterprise that is modern, efficient, uses less gas, and is very important to our 
economy?”241 Further Russian purchases in this period included a 480 million USD sale of the 
Armenian telecom system and a 570 million USD investment commitment by Russian Railways 
upon its purchase of Armenian Railways.242 Various privileges were proffered on account of 
Armenia’s pro-Russian economic foreign policy. In addition to facilitating the improvement of 
Armenia’s energy capabilities and drastically increasing investment, Russia charged Armenia its 
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lowest gas price ($110/TCM) out of all bilateral customers, amounting to less than half the price 
charged on Georgia ($235/TCM).243  
In this period, Armenian elites, grasping with economic isolation, employed Russian 
resources and relations as a means to promote development and growth. Yerevan had made a 
deliberate choice to utilize their growing economic intercourse with Russia as a springboard to 
solve internal dilemmas, concurrently inviting dependence and expanding post-Soviet linkages. 
These conditions laid the framework for Armenia’s definitive ‘Russia decision’ in 2013.  
 
Economic Context in Period 3: Confirmed Trajectory  
The Armenian economy was beset by two shocks in the late 2000s: the 2008 Russo-
Georgian war and the Great Recession. First, the Russo-Georgia conflict endangered Armenia’s 
vital transport routes by obstructing its trade corridors through friendly Georgia. Deliveries of 
basic goods, such as wheat and fuel, were momentarily endangered and shortages followed. 
Later that same year, the global financial crisis produced a dramatic fall in remittances (down 35 
percent) and the availability of credit, leading to investment shortfalls (down 31 percent) with 
catastrophic implications for the economy. Armenia’s GDP shrank by 14 percent and the 
construction industry, previously the engine of the country’s 21st century growth, contracted by 
nearly 42 percent.244 Post-Soviet/Eurasian linkages proved an important mechanism in 
stabilization and recovery. In order to counteract the effects of the recession and jumpstart a 
stimulus program, the Armenian government negotiated with the Russian finance ministry for 
emergency credit; the finalized deal supplied Yerevan with a 500 million USD “stabilization 
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credit” loan from the Russian government.245 Yerevan also joined the Eurasian Development 
Bank (EDB), originally founded in January 2006 by President Putin and President Nazarbayev, 
and the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) with the express purpose of 
combating the economic crisis. Armenia has been a major recipient of EFSD funding. Despite 
contributing only 1 million USD (in contrast to Russia’s 7.5 billion USD), Yerevan has received 
several phases of funding, including a 400 million USD loan from the EFSD in 2011 and another 
300 million in 2016.246 These measures, combined with low interest rates and the gradual 
recovery of remittances, helped restore stability to the Armenian economy.247 
Armenia’s recovery, though slower, solidified the basic parameters of Armenia’s 
economic dependence on Russia. In 2012, total net FDI reserves were 4.6 billion USD of which 
53 percent hailed from CIS countries, predominantly Russia. By 2015, a quarter of all companies 
in Armenia with foreign investment were receiving Russian capital.248 Remittances recovered to 
15 percent of GDP and trade with Russia increased by 4 percent between 2010 and 2012 with 
commodity turnover up 20 percent the subsequent year.249 Concurrently, deteriorating relations 
between the European Union and Russia over Ukraine invited the possibility of Western 
sanctions on Russia just as Armenia was engaged in negotiations with the European Union for an 
Association Agreement. An integrative approach to the Western bloc would have threatened 
intimate economic ties with Russia at a time when the two blocs appeared mutually exclusive.250 
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Furthermore, integration into a Eurasian bloc offered simplified access for key Armenian sectors, 
such as free moment for Armenia’s migratory (and remittance-producing) workforce in Russia, 
stable gas prices during rising prices, and increased trade and investment turnover in addition to 
the already considerable degree of bi-lateral trade intercourse with Russia.251 Determined to 
preserve the strategic economic relationship with Russia, Yerevan announced its ‘Russia 
decision’ in 2013 when it decided to join the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU)—originally 
formed in 2010 by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—effectively ending negotiations with the 
European Union. Unlike the CIS, ripe with economic false starts and integration failures, the 
EACU represented a major phase towards a coherent supranational structure in the post-Soviet 
space, complete with binding decision-making processes.252 In 2012, the EACU was integrated 
into the larger structural framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which established 
a single common market for member-states in addition to coordinated policies across most 
sectors enforced by four intergovernmental bodies and courts.253 Armenia finalized its 
membership in the EAEU in 2015 and remains a proactive member today; former Prime Minister 
Tigran Sargsyan, for example, has chaired the key Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) since 
2016.  
 Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 3: Towards Eurasia  
 In the late 2000s, pro-Russian states in the near abroad, alongside Russia, were 
developing a new model for post-Soviet regional economic integration through the EAEU. At the 
same time, Armenia was negotiating for an EU Association Agreement as its ‘complimentary’ 
trade ties with the European Union were quite strong. Nevertheless, Armenian elites were 
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pursuing a concurrent program of post-Soviet integration that illustrates their sustained 
commitment to post-Soviet integration. In late 2012, Yerevan moved to improve the legal 
framework of their extant economic relations with Russia by supporting a special free trade 
agreement within the CIS. Tigran Davtyan, Sargsyan’s economic minister, emphasized that this 
step would further stimulate existing trade to Armenia’s advantage and promote much needed 
exports.254  
This integration measure into the post-Soviet space preluded the controversial 2013 
decision by Sargsyan to join the EAEU. As illustrated above, Yerevan’s decision was not simply 
the consequence of Russian coercion. Admittedly, pressure was naturally exerted on Yerevan by 
Moscow, particularly by ominous reference to gas prices, but that has to be conditioned by the 
economic realities that Yerevan inhabited. Russia was the instrumental partner for Armenia, both 
in terms of providing security and in terms of economic partnership. It was no surprise then that 
after Yerevan's decision to join the Customs Union that Armenian business largely supported the 
confirmed trajectory, favoring a Eurasian direction over the prospect of implausibly high EU 
standards and a comparatively unfamiliar marketplace.255 Furthermore, even before the alleged 
coercion occurred, Sargsyan stated that Armenia could join the Customs Union and inquired 
about specific paths to membership. His prime minister, Tygran Sargsyan, who opposed joining 
the EEU because Armenia shares no borders with Russia, nevertheless agreed that Armenia 
needed a special form of cooperation with the Customs Union.256 For Yerevan, keeping low gas 
prices and fostering flexible relations with Russia took precedence over a Euro-Atlantic 
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outreach.257 Further integration into the Eurasian sphere (e.g. the EAEU) offered the prospect of 
freer access to the market of the ‘Common Economic Space, further investment inflows into 
export production, free moment of capital, and the abolition of customs duties for the already 
prevalent flow of Armenian goods and services into the Eurasian marketplace.258  
The incorporation of export duty waivers (associated with ECU ascension) into reduced 
gas prices, for example, were projected by the IMF to save Armenia a substantial 1.5 percent of 
GDP per year.259 In effect, Armenia’s pre-existing and growing dependence ensured that 
economic association with Russia was prioritized. Membership in the EAEU would secure and 
develop the linkages maintained and formed over the past two periods. 
At the time, Sargsyan’s decision to join the EEU and then the EAEU (finalized in 2015) 
were highly controversial among the public. As discussed in the previous section, however, 
much of the opposition, legitimately concerned over Sargsyan’s tendency towards 
authoritarianism, saw integration into the EAEU “as the right step” and recognized that the 
maneuver had been motivated by pragmatism.260 Nor did participation in the EAEU preclude 
limited outreach to the West: Armenia has attempted to deliberately ‘bridge’ the European Union 
and the Eurasian Union. For example, Armenia negotiated a ‘Comprehensive and Enhanced 
Partnership Agreement’ with the European Union into 2017, although this ‘engagement’ is not 
commensurate to a full Association Agreement.261 Today, membership in EAEU is generally 
accepted, even though the supposedly anti-EAEU faction assumed power after the 2018 Velvet 
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Revolution. For Armenia, displacing Russia would incur enormous costs that no government has 
appeared willing to stomach. To the contrary, further integrative measures have been the default 
reaction of an Armenian elite unwilling to risk displacing their patron.  
 
Section 3B: Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia 
 
 
Economic Context in Period 1: Temporary Dependence 
As in Armenia, Georgia’s economic condition following independence was marked by 
extreme precarity. The chaotic political condition within Georgia, combined with the collapse of 
Soviet-era linkages, resulted in a situation nearly identical to that in Yerevan: steep declines in 
GDP across all sectors, hyper-inflation (especially severe in Georgia), and energy shortages.262 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tbilisi had received about a quarter of its electricity 
and  almost all of its raw materials and energy sources from Russia. In 1991, approximately two-
thirds of Georgian exports were destined for Russia.263 Immediately following independence, 
Tbilisi implemented a brief but disastrous self-imposed blockade on Russian trade that wreaked 
havoc on its economy. But once the political environment stabilized in 1994, the Georgian 
economy began to recover, and GDP growth reached double digits.  Credit from international 
financing corporations supplied Tbilisi with the necessary finances to control inflation and 
establish a new currency.264 Aggressive privatization and internal reform expedited the recovery, 
though the structural changes made for uneven socio-economic conditions.265  
 Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia was pronounced in two sectors: trade and 
energy. Georgia’s economy was largely reliant on Russian/CIS trade for both imports and 
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exports as a product of the integrated Soviet legacy. In 1995, the CIS imported 62 percent of 
Georgian exports and supplied 45 percent of Georgian imports. For example, Russia imported 
about 75 percent of Georgia’s growing wine market, which constituted an average of 10 percent 
of Georgian exports, and was the primary consumer of Georgia’s leading export, scrap metal. 
Oil, gas, and hydrocarbons, largely inbound from Russia and Azerbaijan, made up over a third of 
total imports.266 Russia’s economic imprint was substantial enough to spark a major economic 
crisis in Georgia—Armenia was also affected—as a result of Russia’s default during the 1998-
ruble crisis. In addition, Tbilisi racked up enormous debts for energy deliveries from Russia; the 
controversy around these debts would eventually serve as the impetus for domestic energy 
reform. As discussed below, Georgian elites initially reacted to these realities much in the same 
way as their Armenian counterparts: by deepening (albeit more conditionally) their institutional 
engagement with Russia.  
Unlike landlocked Armenia, however, which was restricted in the pursuit of an 
alternative economic direction by the blockade and unpalatable transport costs, Georgia’s 
superior geographic position allowed for a broader reconnection with the non-Soviet space and 
the Black Sea region. Dependence on Russia rapidly declined after 1995 and engagement with 
regional and Western markets earned momentum. Turkey, for example, displaced Russia as 
Georgia’s major export market in 2000 as it developed a flourishing consumer goods exchange 
with Tbilisi and also became a primary importer of the Georgian scrap-metal. Over the same 
period, Georgia tripled its exports to the European Union to 18 percent. Germany, in particular, 
played an instrumental role in the new connectivity as Berlin captured 10 percent of the 
Georgian export market by 2000. The largest Georgian export to the European Union, hazelnuts, 
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was one of the few high value products in Georgia’s fragmented trade repertoire of mostly low-
value goods destined for CIS countries.267 At the same time, Georgia managed to secure its place 
in the Transcaucasian energy network through the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, completed in April 
1999.268 It was the first oil pipeline between Georgia and Azerbaijan and a preliminary to 
Georgia’s eventual energy independence from Russia. In effect, Georgia’s reconnection with the 
outside world recalibrated its trade distribution and mitigated its dependence, therefore providing 
a platform from which to encourage greater intercourse and possible integration with the West.  
  
 Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 1: Uneasy Engagement  
 Georgian elites faced the challenge of managing their hyper-dependence on Russian 
economic links while concurrently resisting Russia in the military-security realm. After a 
disastrous experience of Euro-Atlantic exclusivity under Gamsakhurdia, Tbilisi recognized its 
high interconnectivity with Russia and cautiously engaged in Russian and post-Soviet economic 
institutions. Nevertheless, Georgian Euro-Atlanticism conditioned that outreach and limited the 
extent that Georgia was willing to stomach further outreach. For Tbilisi, dependence on Russia 
was an impediment destined to be overcome, and they exemplified this policy by obstructing 
measures in the post-Soviet space for Russian-led integration. As Georgia’s economic trajectory 
shifted beyond the near abroad, Georgian elites moved to de-leverage their extant commitments 
to Russian-led institutions.  
In 1991, Gamsakhurdia attempted a premature ‘defection’ from Russia. This defection 
was not inspired by any economic rationale and simply reflected the extreme manifestation of 
Euro-Atlanticism. He practically imposed a self-blockade by attempting to embargo Russia 
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without recognizing the depth of Soviet economic integration. The severe decline in living 
standards that succeeded the blockade imperiled the popularity of the leadership and contributed 
to Gamsakhurdia’s defeat.269 Contemporary economic conditions were clearly not suitable for a 
definitive ‘Russia decision’ at the time. Even for the Euro-Atlantic elite—already furious with 
Russia over its treatment secessionist states—the political and economic costs associated with 
defection made it prohibitive. Instead, they followed the Armenian path and approached post-
Soviet institutions as unavoidable instruments of stability. Shevardnadze highlighted the 
economic dimension of Georgia’s controversial ascension to the CIS in these terms. He argued 
that Georgia needed to “end our economic isolation” by “renewing traditional economic ties to 
the other states of the former USSR.”270 In trying to convince the Georgian parliament to ratify 
ascension to the CIS, Shevardnadze insisted that Georgia had to "restore broken economic links 
and develop them on a completely new basis, which is a necessary prerequisite for the reforms 
for transition to a market economy” and that the CIS would help “promote stabilization, and halt 
the decline in the population's standard of living.” At this stage, Georgia needed the CIS as much 
for an economic reprieve as it needed it to end the civil war.  
As Georgia’s macroeconomic situation normalized and Georgian economic connectivity 
with the West intensified, however, further Russia-directed integration within the CIS ceased to 
be a necessity. Instead, the Georgian government worked towards an intra-FSU organization that 
would collaboratively encourage Euro-Atlantic economic outreach and impede further CIS 
integration. In 1997, the Georgian, Azerbaijan, and Moldovan governments (later joined by 
Ukraine) formed the regional ‘GUUAM’ organization, representing those states in the near 
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abroad with Euro-Atlantic biases or anti-Russian slants. Though partially motivated by political-
military features that emanated from perceived Russian involvement in the secessionist 
territories and controversies over the CIS Collective Security Treaty, GUUAM’s objectives also 
reflected an acute distrust of further CIS-directed economic integration, especially during a 
period of declining dependence on Russia. For participating countries, pro-integration objectives 
like the CIS free trade zone (supported by Armenia), the CIS Economic Council, the CIS 
Customs and Payments Unions were merely "economic levers by Russia," and instead member-
states should 'break out' by integrating into "transatlantic and European structures."271 In policy 
terms, GUUAM succeeded in promoting anti-Russian economic cooperation, such as a joint 
effort to avoid Russian transport taxes on Central Asian goods.272 The drive towards overcoming 
economic dependence, predictably, gained additional purchase after the disastrous system-wide 
downturn in the 1998 Russian financial crisis.  
 Georgian elites in this period confronted severe economic instability and high 
dependence on Russia. Though they were inclined to the Euro-Atlantic trajectory, 
Gamsakhurdia’s example had shown that outright defection from Russia, given Georgia’s 
extensive dependence on post-Soviet networks, was incompatible with political survival. Instead, 
Shevardnadze and his colleagues embraced a cautious approach to the CIS until Georgia’s 
degree of economic dependence had decreased to manageable levels, at which point Georgia 
could pursue a more determined Euro-Atlantic policy, as evinced by Tbilisi’s participation in 
GUUAM.  
Economic Context in Period 2 and Period 3: ‘Breaking-Out’  
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 The Rose Revolution triggered a slate of neo-liberal reforms relating to privatization, 
coherent taxation, debt reduction, and free trade. The ensuing improvement in the business 
environment and rising domestic demand sparked a surge in foreign investment. Similarly to 
Armenia, Georgian economic growth initially became dependent on loans, investments, and 
transfers from abroad, mostly concentrated in the energy, construction, and trade sectors. But the 
sources of Georgia investment contrasted quite sharply with that of Armenia. In fact, the defining 
feature of the post-revolutionary era was declining economic dependence on Russia and rising 
dependence on the West was the expansion of Euro-Atlantic investment and direct assistance.  
First, although remittances grew by almost 7 times in the second period, they constituted 
a comparatively smaller proportion of Georgia’s economy. Remittances peaked in 2008 at about 
1 billion USD and averaged around 6 percent of GDP per year. Unsurprisingly, most Georgian 
migrants worked in Russia, which had an estimated 200 thousand Georgian workers, and sent 
nearly 65 percent of total remittances back to Georgia.273 When adjusted against Armenia’s 
smaller population, however, Georgian remittances from Russia constituted a far smaller value 
per capita. Remittances have accordingly not featured prominently in Russo-Georgian relations.  
 Second, in contrast to remittances, FDI and direct assistance was instrumental in 
Georgia’s development. Total FDI, attracted by Georgia’s privatization reforms, quadrupled 
from its pre-revolution levels to reach 2 billion USD in 2007.274 Total investment stock shrank 
after the 2008 war and the global recession but then returned to average about 1.7 billion USD 
per year from 2014 to 2018. The defining feature of this uptick in FDI was the concentrated level 
of Euro-Atlantic investment. Collectively, EU member-states attained the position of principal 
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investor in Georgia, though the United States was the single largest bi-lateral investor. At the 
height of the investment surge in 2007, investment from EU member-states provided nearly 60 
percent of Georgia’s total FDI, and they retain that predominant status today.275 Furthermore, the 
value of these investments, according to the IMF, remain “crucial” for Georgia’s economic 
development.276 Georgia’s 2015 EU Association Agreement has reinforced the trajectory by 
encouraging further European investment into the economy, including a massive 3.8 billion USD 
program for Georgian infrastructure as part of the Eastern Partnership; Armenia has been allotted 
only about a quarter of that value.277 By contrast, Russia’s stake never accounted for more than 
10 percent of FDI after 1996, when total investment were already relatively low, and its share 
was effectively crowded out by Western investments. FDI from Russia even briefly became 
negative in 2013, indicating that the threat of Russian FDI withdrawal represents a negligible 
threat to the Georgian economy.278 Against the example of Armenia, Georgia is not dependent on 
Russian investment.  
Therefore, in definitional terms the extent of dependence on Russia has declined. The 
largest investments, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the ‘Southern Corridor’ 
(Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum) natural gas pipeline, were considered to be central elements of the 
Euro-Atlantic energy strategy in a collective effort to reduce dependence on Russia. The former 
was largely encouraged by the United States to weaken Russian and Iranian regional influence, 
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and the latter by the European Union to increase the energy independence of its member states. 
Tbilisi was also among the largest per capita recipients of direct US aid, amounting to nearly 1 
billion USD between 2001 and 2007. After the 2008 war, Georgia received nearly 500 million 
euros in post-conflict assistance from the European Union.  
In 2005, Georgia was awarded a 295 million USD grant by the U.S Millennium 
Challenge Corporation for transport and pipeline infrastructure.279 The construction of these 
pipelines strengthened the economic autonomy of Georgia, reduced Russian influence, and 
confirmed the pre-eminent position of ‘Western actors.’280 Armenia, under prolonged blockade 
over Nagorno-Karabakh, was never afforded such opportunities; the contrast is an excellent 
example of the interaction between the ability to decrease economic dependence and the 
apparent permanence of constructed realities. Armed with these Euro-Atlantic investments, 
Georgia’s energy dependence on Russia has been practically negated. By 2010, hydrocarbons 
were imported overwhelmingly, both in value and volume, from the European Union (Romania 
and Bulgaria) and Azerbaijan against Russia’s shrinking share, which had fallen to one-tenth of 
total Georgian hydrocarbon imports. Natural gas imports from Azerbaijan alone grew by more 
than 11 times between 2010 and 2013.281 As Georgia gets an apportioned, and growing, share of 
the total fuel transmitted through the Southern Corridor, recent estimates project that this share 
will only continue to grow once the supply chain extends through the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 
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which will connect Turkey with southern Europe.282 Furthermore, the changes should not be 
viewed as an immediate consequence of the 2008 military conflict but as a development that 
preceded it. For example, since 2007 Georgia has been a net-exporter of electricity to Russia on 
account of concentrated Western and domestic investment into hydroelectric capacities.283 
Energy dependence on Russia, once an obvious element of Georgia’s geo-political situation, has 
been effectively supplanted by energy dependence on the EU and Azerbaijan.  
At least initially, Georgia’s trade dependence on Russia remained an enduring legacy of 
the preceding period. Russia was Georgia’s largest bi-lateral importer, although the European 
Union as a collective entity had since overtaken Russia. The changing dynamics of comparative 
advantage in the post-Soviet space, however, favored reorientation towards superior Western 
markets, if available, and Russo-Georgian trade links subsequently declined.284 This dynamic 
was supplemented by an intrusion from the security realm. Georgia and Russia engaged in a tit-
for-tat escalation over Tbilisi's push for NATO membership and for recovery of the secessionist 
states, culminating in Russia’s 2006 severance of trade and transport links to Georgia.285 This 
imposed a serious cost on Tbilisi and Georgian elites, but Georgia’s trade dependence was not 
nearly as extensive as it had been under Gamsakhurdia, and Georgia was able to adjust. 
Exporters took advantage of the moment to lay their vestigial dependence on Russia to rest as 
they pursued compensatory markets for Georgian goods.286 Saakashvili even boasted that 
Georgia had successfully overcame its residual economic dependence and that as a result, the 
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“embargo has lost any sense.”287 Until 2012, when relations were normalized under the Georgian 
Dream government, Georgian exports to Russia were non-existent. Since then Russia has 
accounted for no more than 14 percent of exports and 10 percent of imports. Meanwhile, the EU 
has maintained its leadership lead in the Georgian trade market with 27 percent of overall trade 
even before the 2015 Association Agreement, which briefly stimulated another uptick in 
Georgia-EU trade turnover.288  
Three central elements have therefore inverted Georgia’s reliance on Russia into 
dependence on the Euro-Atlantic sphere. The first is the strategic importance of FDI in the 
Georgian economy and the decisive role that European-directed investment played in 
establishing, maintaining, and growing that stakeholdership. The second is the convergence of 
domestic efforts to increase energy independence, particularly through the hydroelectric industry, 
and Euro-American pipeline strategies. These mutually reinforcing developments enabled 
Georgia to break out of its previously extreme hydrocarbon dependence on Russia. The third has 
been the deposition of Russia’s formerly predominant role within Georgia’s trade market, mostly 
as a function of macroeconomic re-calibration to more competitive markets as well as various 
sanctions imposed by Russia as a result of security conflicts emanating from Tbilisi’s Euro-
Atlantic constructed reality. The net result has been the loss of Russia’s economic position in 
Georgia, previously a decisive element (e.g. the CIS) in keeping Georgia connected to Russia 
and the post-Soviet space.  
Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 3: Towards the West 
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 As discussed in the previous section, Saakashvili brought a definitive affiliation with 
Euro-Atlantic structures into power. From an economic perspective, the European Union was an 
obvious destination for Tbilisi’s desired integration. The EU’s decision to include Georgia (along 
with Armenia and Azerbaijan) in its 2004 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) sparked a 
euphoric optimism in Tbilisi that Georgian membership in the European Union was only a matter 
of time. Saakashvili remarked that the “EU has recognized that we have a chance of joining the 
EU after some time...this may happen quite soon.” He would even proclaim in the presence of 
the EU leadership, frequently to little reaction, that Georgia’s ascension was imminent.289 In 
reality, the EU’s mechanisms for integration required not only the European political will to 
expand into the chaotic South Caucasus, but also underlying commercial and economic linkages. 
Although the former tendency has contributed to EU reticence with regards to extending actual 
membership, growing economic ties between the European Union and Georgia enabled Tbilisi to 
deepen its institutional engagement in the EU’s structure. For example, Tbilisi only qualified for 
involvement in the EU Generalized Scheme of Preference Plus (GSP+) program—for Georgia 
the predecessor stage before an EU DCFTA—because GSP+ requirements demanded a certain 
level of extant trade interconnectivity with the EU.290 Extant and growing trade linkages 
therefore provided the platform for elites to deepen their institutional engagement with the 
European Union. 
At the same time, Tbilisi was taking advantage of underlying economic changes, 
particularly rising Western FDI, to simultaneously lessen dependence on Russia and strengthen 
its structural relationship with Europe. Georgian elites effectively imagined that they could 
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employ their attractive investment environment and translate it into programs that would make 
Georgia an indispensable component of the European Union’s energy-security network. The 
push for energy independence had gained additional traction when Russia, employing its then-
monopoly on supplying Georgian gas, reacted to Saakashvili's push for NATO membership by 
raising gas prices in 2006.291 But Tbilisi was already attracting the sources necessary to 
overcome its remaining energy dependence. Saakashvili's government, for example, deployed 
the Diplomatic Service to "stimulate Euro-Atlantic interest" in developing pipeline and energy 
routes beneficial for the EU. Gela Bezhuashvili, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted in the 
2006 National Security Concept that a key Georgian priority was “identifying alternative ways of 
transporting Caspian Sea energy resources to European markets with the aim of ending Europe’s 
dangerous dependence on a single provider [Russia].”292 In this regard, Tbilisi considered itself 
as a valuable potential asset in the European economic chassis. Indeed, the Southern Corridor 
pipeline forms a variation of institutional deepening, especially since the EU regards it as a 
permanent cornerstone of energy policy.293  
The 2015 Association Agreement and DCFTA with the European Union represents the 
natural culmination of Georgia’s economic linkages with the West and the gradual disintegration 
of dependence on Russia. Negotiations commenced in 2010 when trade relations with Russia 
were still prohibited as a result of the 2008 war and concluded in 2013. Since September 2014, 
and as a result of the DCFTA, the EU has almost completely liberalized imports from Georgia.294 
But even before this opening, the European Union was concurrently the largest investor and 
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trade partner with Georgia. Georgia's government viewed negotiations as building off extant 
economic relations towards the direction of comprehensive integration. In addition, many 
political and policy elites, including Kakha Gogolashvili, the Director of the Georgian-European 
Policy and Legal Advice Center, view the Association Agreement and the DCFTA as 
representing the ‘conclusive’ stage of integration.295 Ivanishvili, in spite of his mildly 
conciliatory attitude towards Russia, captured this point when he declared his hopes to “make 
Georgia’s EU integration irreversible.”296 Georgia’s successful negotiations and the completion 
of an EU Association Agreement should therefore be contrasted against the background of 
Armenia’s reversal into the Customs Unions and then the EAEU. The discernible dividing 
element was clearly the complete lack of Georgian dependence on Russia, which permitted 
flexibility and outreach to the Euro-Atlantic structures without risking economic instability from 
such a ‘defection.’  
 
Diagram 3: Economic Dependence and ‘Institutional Engagement’ 
 
Country Period  Economic Dependence on 
Russia/CIS  
Elite Responses to Dependence (examples) 
Armenia 1 High, declining but valuable trade 
dependence.  
CIS membership, ruble-zone preservation, 
FTAs with FSU states. 
2 High, dependence on investment. Bi-lateral swaps and asset sales with Russia. 
3 High, sustained trade and 
investment dependence. 
CIS FTA, EEU/EAEU (abandonment of EU 
Association Agreement).  
Georgia 1 High, but declining trade 
dependence.  
CIS membership; as dependence decreases, 
participation in GUAM to spoil integration. 
2/3 Eventually low, attained by 
Western investment attracted by 
post-Rose Revolution reforms. 
Southern Corridor pipeline agreements, EU 
integration (DCFTA, Association Agreement). 
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Discussion: Constructed Realities and Economic Dependence 
 
In the previous sections, it has been shown that identity-driven constructed realities 
prejudiced national leadership to divergent blocs and that the degree of contemporary economic 
dependence was a primary motivating (and occasionally restraining) factor in their international 
trajectories. These two variables, however, should not be considered clearly delimited and 
separate. The variables, in fact, frequently reinforced each other and helped confirm the 
respective long-term trajectory. To give a broad illustration, the predilection of Georgian elites 
for the West was supplemented by a rising Western imprint in the economy. Without economic 
interest from the West, which largely supplanted Russian linkages, Georgian elites might not 
have had the flexibility to pursue their desired push to the West. Indeed, the evidence from 
Georgia’s first period evinces the point: Tbilisi's Euro-Atlantic desire had to be relegated beneath 
economic necessity, which demanded at least some initial outreach to Russia (e.g. the CIS) 
despite elite discomfort. Armenia provides the counterpoint. Yerevan was unable to attract 
sufficient Western investment as a result of a constructed reality that permitted little compromise 
over Nagorno-Karabakh and therefore prolonged a damaging blockade. Armenian elites thus 
defaulted on their traditional patron—inviting self-reinforcing dependence on Russia that 
culminated with their definitive affiliation with Eurasia.   
Several specific examples will further illustrate the degree to which these two variables 
confirmed national trajectories. Take, for example, Armenian diaspora investors and remittance-
producers in Russia. Almost 2 million Armenians in Russia belong to an organization called the 
Union of Armenians in Russia (UAR), led by the wealthy businessman and investor, Ara 
Abramian, and many utilize this connection to spend lavishly back in Armenia.297 The UAR 
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actively promotes the Eurasianist and pro-Russian beliefs shared by many elites back in Yerevan, 
and have employed their substantial economic leverage to encourage institutional engagement 
between Armenia and Russia on account of Armenia’s dependence on diaspora-sourced FDI 
from Russia.298 For example, Abramian was a decisive influence in the slate of bi-lateral swap 
agreements in the early 2000s that deepened relations with Russia and stimulated further 
investment.299 Another informative example is Armenia’s membership in the EAEU. In the 
previous section the economic motivations behind joining the EAEU were discussed, but 
obviously wider security considerations were reflected upon as well. One opposition MP noted 
that because of the Turkish blockade that Armenia was presented with “no alternative” and that 
Yerevan had to join the EAEU to “maintain its security; our [European] partners must 
understand our conditions...we don’t have open borders and they must remember this reality.”300 
At the same time, all Armenian political parties argue that Nagorno-Karabakh can only be settled 
upon international recognition of Artsakh, an unlikely outcome any time in the near future.301  
Armenia’s relatively isolated geo-political situation, a product of its constructed reality, has 
therefore pushed Armenia into sustained economic dependence with Russia and reinforced its 
theoretical role as Yerevan’s protector. Indeed, the Armenian public near-unanimously support 
Russia’s position as Armenia’s “main friend.”302  
For Georgia, it was partially Western economic support and investment that enabled 
Tbilisi to realize the aspirations of Euro-Atlantic affiliation. To give one example, energy 
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dependence was one of the levers employed by Russia to influence Yerevan into the EACU, 
although typically Armenian elites invited energy dependence without additional pressure from 
Moscow. Raising gas prices was a conventional strategy that Russia had employed to warn 
Georgian elites against realizing their Euro-Atlantic ambitions, which would invite NATO to 
Russia’s borders against Moscow’s insistences.303 Western investment, however, has enabled 
Georgia to strategically overcome this dependence through pipeline construction and domestic 
energy production. Russia has few remaining available measures to influence Tbilisi as it did in 
Armenia and therefore Georgian elites, unlike their Armenian counterparts, have been able to 
pursue Euro-Atlantic outreaches, such as completing an EU Association Agreement. Armenia, 
meanwhile, has been deliberately excluded from energy transit networks as a direct result of its 
standoff with Azerbaijan and Turkey.  
In effect, the decline in economic dependence was an enabling factor for Tbilisi to pursue 
its Western proclivity without interference. For Armenia, the experience was inverted as 
Yerevan’s ‘complimentary’ predilection proved incompatible with macroeconomic realities that 
emanated from their geo-political situation. President Sargsyan summarized that reality best 
when he noted: "...since we share a system of military security, it is impossible and inefficient to 
isolate ourselves from the corresponding geo-economical space.”304 Formidable pro-Russian 
affiliations among the elite, and the necessity of maintaining Moscow’s security paternalism, 
ensured that few efforts were undertaken to reverse Armenia’s dependence.  
Comparisons Revisited 
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In reviewing the sources behind national trajectories, two decisive variables have been 
examined as determining Armenia’s close cooperation with Russia and Georgia’s defection to 
the West. The divergence in the direction of relations reflects the contrasting disposition of 
constructed realities between Georgian and Armenian elites as well as their reactions to 
alternating levels of economic dependence.  
As discussed, within the personality-driven governments of the South Caucasus, the 
opinions of leading elites served as a crucial determiner of foreign policy. In both Georgia and 
Armenia, political experiences in the pre-Soviet period and the immediate post-Soviet period 
conditioned elite visions for their states within the post-Soviet space. For Georgia, the troubling 
legacy of Russia as an imperial power and Soviet master was strengthened by Moscow’s alleged 
promotion of secessionism. With the addition of an identity-driven affiliation with ‘the West,’ 
Georgian elites developed a durable constructed reality, Euro-Atlanticism, that endorsed an 
interrelated vision of Georgian territorial integrity (recovering the secessionist territories), Euro-
Atlantic integration (membership in NATO, the EU, etc.), and anti-Russian sentiment. Yerevan’s 
inheritance from the pre-Soviet moment was quite similar to that of Tbilisi: the desire for the 
recovery of lost territories, a vague ‘complementary’ affiliation to Europe, and concern about 
Russian power. But unlike Georgia, Armenian elites also entertained an historically informed 
role for Russia as Yerevan’s protector against traditional enemies in Baku and Istanbul. The 
prioritization of saving Nagorno-Karabagh induced the adoption of a constructed reality 
(Complementary-Eurasianism) that projected Russia as Armenia’s security guarantor and 
‘othered’ Turkey and, especially, Azerbaijan. The subsequent imposition of a joint Turkish-Azeri 
blockade of Armenia confirmed the necessity of some Eurasian affiliation by deepening 
Yerevan’s immediate security and economic dependence on Russia.  
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In both countries, the ‘median’ version of each constructed reality has endured among the 
political leadership throughout the post-Soviet period. Only Ter-Petroysan, the exception that 
proves the rule, resisted that logic while in office (despite his instrumental role in creating the 
conditions necessary for the Eurasian-tilt), and he paid the price at the hands of elites committed 
to the constructed reality. Otherwise, all leading political figures and ruling parties, including 
those that previously hailed from skeptical opposition parties, have conformed to their respective 
constructed realities. Such durability has sharpened the divergence in national trajectories by 
constant adherence to policies informed by the constructed realities. For Georgia the 
predominance of the Euro-Atlanticism among political elites allowed for a sustained push against 
intra-FSU integration in the post-Soviet space and towards integration into Western structures. 
Within the CIS, for example, Tbilisi played a spoiling role in integrative efforts by aligning with 
other skeptical member-states and courting Western attention through GUAM. Later it would 
refuse to renew its membership in the CIS’ security treaty, and eventually defected outright at the 
nadir of relations with Russia. Armenia’s approach towards post-Soviet linkages was very 
different. Political elites in Yerevan reflected their commitment to the constructed reality by 
deepening their involvement in post-Soviet structures. The leadership in Yerevan promoted 
stronger connections within the CIS, for example, and actively engaged in the CIS’ security 
framework. The culmination of the gradual deepening of relations between Armenia and Russia, 
represented by the decision of the Sargsyan government (steeped in the Eurasian preference) to 
join the EAEU was a stark contrast with Georgia’s experience in post-Soviet linkages. 
Outreach to the West was also conditioned by underlying constructed realities. Despite a 
general identity-driven affiliation with Europe, Armenia’s national narrative in the post-Soviet 
period, centered around Nagorno-Karabagh, precluded any excessive association with blocs 
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competing with Russia, best represented by NATO and the EU. Armenian elites therefore 
confined their engagement with NATO to technical and cooperative assistance without a long-
term aspiration for integration, and made far more limited arrangements with the EU, especially 
in comparison to their participation in the EAEU and Georgia’s outreach. Indeed, Tbilisi’s 
constructed-reality demanded that the leadership push for the West and ‘break-out’ from 
Russia’s post-Soviet vision. At first chance, Shevardnadze pivoted Georgia to the West, and the 
political elites continued to prioritize integration into the EU and NATO as an interrelated 
function of their desire for territorial sovereignty, their embrace of European identity, and their 
anti-Russian sentiments. The constancy of the median constructed reality among Georgian elites 
ensured that the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy was maintained, culminating in military conflict 
with Russia and deeper integration into Western structures (i.e. the Association Agreement).  
The degree of economic dependence on Russia and the post-Soviet also influenced the 
divergent trajectories of the two countries. At the initial post-independence stage, trade in both 
countries was overwhelmingly dependent on Russia and the CIS. Though this dependence 
quickly declined as Georgia and Armenia opened to global markets, elites in both countries 
responded to the initial situation by engaging in post-Soviet institutions to stabilize their 
precarious economies. Thereafter the trajectory of dependence diverged and accordingly the 
responses of elites diverged as well. Georgia attracted significant Western FDI and trade that 
encouraged European and Georgian elites to promote further institutional integration, 
particularly into EU programs. Georgian elites, certainly prejudiced by their Euro-Atlantic 
preferences, also leveraged this advantage to confirm their autonomy by pursuing energy 
independence, such as participation in regional pipeline politics and construction. Yerevan, by 
contrast, was a major recipient of Russia-directed investment and remittances, and less able to 
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adjust to investment and trade conditions favorable to the West during the blockade. Attempts to 
attract Western investment into Armenian enterprises repeatedly faltered and thereby accentuated 
Armenia’s dependence on Russia. Ruling elites therefore consciously moved closer to Russia in 
order to exploit Armenia’s extant dependence for further assistance. For example, they 
encouraged the flow of investments by large asset sales to Russian companies. In contrast to the 
Georgian push for energy independence, Armenia remained completely dependent on Russian 
energy, and elites actively deepened its dependence to gain favorable terms and prices. Just as 
Georgia had responded to its rising dependence on the West and declining dependence on Russia 
by amplifying its push for Euro-Atlantic integration, Armenian elites responded to economic 
dependence by confirming Armenia’s ‘Eurasian’ national trajectory. Certainly by Yerevan’s 
2013 decision to join the EACU the value of underlying economic linkages with Russia was 
sufficient to enable the Armenian government to definitively align with Moscow.  
Two pathways have unfolded as a result of these determining variables. Georgia, largely 
integrated into Western networks and guided by a pro-Western political leadership, has remained 
fixed on attaining full Euro-Atlantic membership. By contrast, Armenia, heavily dependent on 
Russian economic linkages and led by political elites with a sustained commitment to the EAEU, 
remains a dependable partner of Russia within the post-Soviet space.  
Conclusion 
Great powers are rarely paragons of virtue. Russia is certainly no exception to the rule. 
But the tendency to view relations in the near abroad as an exclusive function of Russian 
initiative denies sufficient attention to determining variables originating from the opposite actor. 
Instead, this research has reveals that the direction of relations after the disintegration of the 
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USSR reflected small-state elite perceptions, generally inspired by developments in the pre-
Soviet and Soviet era, about the role and form of their nation in the post-Soviet space. In 
addition, the evolving degree of economic dependence between the subject states and Russia 
either encouraged cooperation and further integration (high dependence) or laid the groundwork 
for a definitive ‘defection’ away from Moscow (low dependence). Contrary to the interpretations 
put forward by subscribers of the ‘conventional wisdom,’ issues of national identity, territorial 
unity, and enduring economic linkages proved far more determinative than any supposition of 
Russian aggression in the trajectory of relations. While this research is confined to Georgia and 
Armenia, in which the elite personalization of foreign policy is an accepted condition in the 
literature, the analytical strategy adopted could theoretically extend across the South Caucasus, 
Central Asia, and Eastern Europe, where political elites also share identity-determined 
constructed realities and economies are variously dependent or independent of Russia.  
 From a Western perspective, the implications for this alternative method of examining 
the near abroad are appreciable. Western policymakers and leaders have an obvious tendency to 
view Russia as a revisionist power in the post-Soviet space. The 2008 war in Georgia, for 
example, was largely framed as a struggle between ‘David vs Goliath’ with Russia cast in the 
role of obvious aggressor. Little attention was afforded to the militant desire by Georgian elites 
to recover the secessionist territories nor Tbilisi's almost chiliastic Euro-Atlantic push to 
integrate into the West and draw associated security and economic institutions against Russia’s 
border. As for Armenia, its extensive association with Russia is frequently framed as the 
nefarious product of Russian coercion. Such an attitude would certainly come as some surprise to 
many Armenian elites, who see Russia as the indispensable partner both in security and 
economic spheres. Indeed, as this research has sought to illustrate, neither Georgia’s ‘defection’ 
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nor Armenia’s ‘co-operation’ have been the direct consequence of sustained Russian bellicosity, 
but the product of longer-term trajectories affected by elites and evolving economic linkages.  
 The reality of small-state driven trajectories, informed by the experiences of Georgia and 
Armenia, necessitates a re-appraisal of Russia’s geo-political posture in the near abroad. First, 
Russia and FSU states share innumerable legacies from the Soviet period. These issues, 
discussed in this paper, can range from economic configuration to national identity. The extent of 
overlapping experience merits a return to President Medvedev’s earlier claim that the ‘near 
abroad’ is defined by its status as a ‘reciprocal zone of interest.’ Naturally the claim somewhat 
oversimplifies all relationships between Russia and post-Soviet states; the Georgian leadership 
might define it instead as a reciprocal zone of conflict. But for many FSU states the assertion 
rings true. Armenia’s post-independence political leadership has placed a strategic premium on 
the relationship with Russia, and they would certainly view Russia’s actions in the near abroad 
vis-à-vis Armenia as indicative of a ‘reciprocal interest.’ Other states in the near abroad, such as 
Kyrgyzstan (another landlocked EAEU member), share the view from Yerevan. Only dramatic 
over-simplifications reduce the amenability of these states to Russia and its integrative post-
Soviet program as the exclusive product of Russian imperialism. Even at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, such as in Ukraine or Georgia, the legacy of pre-Soviet, Soviet, and immediate post-
Soviet experiences are palpable in instigating conflict. Nor are these examples strictly 
informative about Russian culpability; the Georgian government demonstrated, for example, a 
constant proclivity for forceful recovery of the secessionist territories and a fixed desire for Euro-
Atlantic integration, despite understandable Russian concerns about a new NATO presence on 
their southern border.  
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 Though inconceivable in the present political environment, the United States and the 
West should adjust both their conception of Russia’s position in the near abroad and policies 
affecting Russia's role in the region. By re-evaluating Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space from 
an imperial power to a great power within a framework of shared regional interests, the West can 
pivot away from an aggravating position of excessive confrontation and misplaced alarm towards 
Moscow. Any assumption that the re-constitution of the Soviet empire is Russia’s raison d'etre 
misses the subtler pattern of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, more focused on 
institutional integration and strengthening post-Soviet linkages than fomenting trouble for 
expansionist ambitions. In conflict areas, Russian policy, as in Georgia, has tended to follow a 
reactive pathway, obscuring claims that Moscow’s aggression has warranted intrusion by the 
West. In fact, the expansion of NATO, especially in the post-Soviet period, constitutes a far 
more provocative measure than Russia could ever produce against the West. It is little surprise 
then that Russia has quarreled with states that have participated in the eastward expansion of 
Euro-Atlantic structures, which it views as interfering in the ‘reciprocal zones of interest’ and 
promoting conflict by affording protection to querulous elites, as in Tbilisi. The unclear 
advantages of a permanent Western intrusion into the post-Soviet space—producing in many 
cases an unnecessary escalation of tensions between the United States and Russia—merits 
reconsideration. Instead, the United States and the West should focus on collaborative and 
developmental efforts to build a partnership with Russia, rather than normalize a fixed and 
unproductive enmity by disregarding legitimate Russian interests in the near abroad.  
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